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Standing upon the shore of all we know
We linger for a moment doubtfully,
Then with a song upon our lips, sail we
Across the harbor bar —no chart to show,
No light to warn of rocks which lie below,
But let us yet forth courageously.
T.S. Eliot
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Outline
Choices are quintessential to our lives. Whether we realize it or not, we make
thousands of them everyday, shaping our lives deeply. Among the choices
we make, choosing what to eat represents one of the most important, as our
lives depend on it. Food choice is a complex phenomenon, that is character-
ized by physiological, affective and cognitive determinants. These dimensions,
however, have been studied either separately or jointly but without offering a
comprehensive mechanistic approach that could pinpoint which cognitive as-
pects drive food choice. Most of the literature on the topic stems either from
decision-making in cognitive neuroscience (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Kra-
jbich et al., 2012, 2015; Levy and Glimcher, 2011; Mormann et al., 2010; Pear-
son et al., 2014), considering food only as a special case of a general theory
on value-based choice, or comes from experimental psychology and consumer
research (Rozin, 1996; Shepherd and Raats, 2006), where it lacks a mechanistic
approach to the neurocognitive determinants of food choice.
In my thesis work, I aimed to bridge this gap by showing how we can study
food choice combing the two lines of research. This could be done, I believe, by
employing a set of different behavioral, neural and computational approaches.
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In my first Study I focused on the interaction of a cognitive on a physi-
ological aspect (calories) in food choice, that is, how people understand and
judge calories when it comes to choosing different food items. Calories are a
fundamental element in driving choice about food, as they give us the energy
we need to survive, grow and reproduce. But still little is known about the
cognitive processes underlying their evaluation. In fact, it has been shown
that the energy density (calorie content) of a food can bias the estimation of a
portion size (Frobisher and Maxwell, 2003; Japur and Diez-Garcia, 2010), and
vice versa (Wansink and Kim, 2005). However, we still do not know whether
calories are considered as an absolute (total in a portion. Caloric Content,
CC) or a relative (related to the type of food. Caloric Density, CD) quantity,
which has implication as to the importance of controlling the size of portions
in meals to contrast overeating (Rozin et al., 2011). I hypothesized that the
type of food would be more important than the total amount of calories in
a portion in determining how calories are understood, giving rise to known
problems in estimating portion size.
In my second Study, I wanted to investigate the neurocognitive mechanism
of the interplay between a physiological (calories) and a cognitive-affective as-
pect (perception of risk). Safety concerns about food represent a powerful
factor shaping food choice (Rosati and Saba, 2004), but little is known about
how people choose food when it is at risk of being contaminated, with no
knowledge about how different aspects of risk and reward (calories) interact
with each other. I hypothesized that risk would drive the choice with partici-
pants choosing conservatively the least risky options, with a possible exception
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represented by food with higher CD. What the results show is that overall
participants were risk averse, while high calorie foods managed to partially
counteract this tendency, i.e., some of them were chosen. Deactivation of the
right anterior insula, a risk prediction error area (Preuschoff et al., 2008), as
well as activation of the pre-SMA, implicated in working memory (d’Esposito
et al., 1998; Pessoa et al., 2002; Petit et al., 1998), supported the idea that
perceived differences in calories among the items made the task easier when it
comes to risk evaluation.
In my third Study, I wanted to investigate how a physiological element
like hunger would impact on two components, one physiological (calorie) and
one affective (preference) using a computational approach. While there is a
wealth of research on the effects of hunger on food choice (Frank et al., 2010;
Hoefling and Strack, 2010; Piech et al., 2010; Read and Van Leeuwen, 1998;
Reisenman, 2014; Siep et al., 2009), we still lack a mechanistic approach that
could help us examining the effects of hunger on calorie and preference at the
same time. I hypothesized that hunger would make calories more important
in determining choice, while satiety would, on the other hand, prioritize the
role of preference in determining the pattern of choices. Using a drift-diffusion
modeling approach I managed to show how hunger has opposite effects on
calorie and preference, with participants choosing more high calorie and less
preferred items when hungry and low calorie and high preferred items when
satiated.
Overall, with this work I aimed to show that the complexity of food choice
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can be stripped down to three basic dimensions (physiology, affect and cogni-
tion) and their interactions and that it is possible to study it, without too much
sacrifice in terms of ecological validity, by using a template made of different
analytic and quantitative approaches, from behavioral, to computational and
neuroimaging.
14
1. Introduction
1.1 Choice
Everyday we choose. It might be trivial to say that you choose what to buy at
the grocery store on your way home so that you can cook a decent, satisfying
dinner after a day of work. But also the choice of actually going to the store
is a decision that rules out other possibilities, such as exercising, ordering out
food or enjoying an aperitivo with your friends in that place you really like.
Some choices are important, like whether you want to buy a house. Others
are more trivial, like which brand of toothpaste you buy at the supermarket.
However, what makes even trivial choices important is the way they accumulate
in patterns that self-repeat without explicit deliberation, i.e., habits, which can
deeply shape our well-being, health and quality of life (Duhigg, 2012). This
is especially true in the case of food choice, as we depend on it to sustain
ourselves, although we may scarcely realize it, as most of us in the western
world live amidst general abundance (Shepherd, 2001).
15
1.2 Theoretical perspectives on Choice
Given the role choices play in our everyday life it comes hardly as a surprise
that humanity has tried to make sense of them for centuries. This can be nicely
described, I believe, as a set of perspectives that allows to tackle this issue from
different angles. In my opinion, based on a review of the literature, three of
them deserve especially our attention. A philosophical, or speculative, the most
dated and long-standing, alongside more recent axiomatic and experimental
approaches.
1.2.1 Speculative approach
How the pattern of choices performed by individuals shapes the structure of
society and its interaction - as well as its wealth - has been at the core of the
interest of the first political economists from the enlightenment onward. It is,
for instance, in the works of John Locke (Locke, 1700), Bernard Mandeville
(Mandeville, 1795) and Adam Smith (Smith, 1827) that we can find the notion
that individuals pursuing their self-interest can, overall, produce an outcome
that is better off for everyone. However, this approach, that we can call - hope-
fully without making offense to too many philosophers - speculative, can be
largely considered, as the name suggests, an intellectual endeavor. Using sharp
arguments, thought experiments and examples, what these thinkers hoped to
show was that we can make sense of how people make choices using rational de-
liberation. While this is indeed a good first step, addressing the issue without
16
investigating how people actually choose offers a poor ground for any theory
of choice. In fact, without any room for testing our hypotheses in reality, we
fail to provide a theory that can be disputed with evidence (Popper, 1938).
The second issue is the lack of a model of how choices are taken and interact
with each other, which allows not only to explain but also to predict, both
basic tenets of a scientific explanation (Ladyman, 2002). This approach has
endured through the centuries and, in fact, although choice can be considered
the cornerstone of modern and contemporary social sciences, it is not until
recently that the process of making a choice has been studied scientifically.
1.2.2 Axiomatic approach
Once we take a closer look at the process of choice, we immediately realize one
central point, namely the notion of preference, which can be considered in its
basic logical sense as the hierarchy of values that different items represent for a
chooser (Rescher, 1968)1. Without it, most choices would be random, as items
would not have, by definition, different values for the chooser. As preference
- a way to hierarchically order value (Von Wright, 1963) - can be considered
largely subjective, the problem of studying it in a quantifiable manner becomes
tricky. One successful approach in dealing with this issue can be traced back
to the work of a group of economists starting in the 1930s, most notably Ken-
neth Arrow (Arrow, 1959), Ge´rard Debreu (Debreu, 1954) and Paul Samuelson
1There are numerous other ways to conceive preference, including in terms of attitudes
towards a set of objects or actions (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). However, what I want
to stress here is its ordinal aspect, that is, the fact that it allows to construct a (subjective)
hierarchy of values or actions.
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(Samuelson, 1938). Their idea was to rely on a few sets of primitive assump-
tions about preferences that could be formalized mathematically and used to
model choice behavior on a large scale (we can call this approach axiomatic).
Their models were strongly normative, with little regard to the empirical work
of experimental psychologists, but without doubt have paved the way to study
choice more systematically and precisely. Their work impinged on the notion
of revealed preferences (Samuelson, 1938). If the value of the items for a sub-
ject cannot be measured by reading someone’s mind, it can be clearly inferred
from her pattern of choices, i.e., her behavior. If she prefers an apple to an
orange, and grapes to an apple and her behavior is consistent, we can write
her preferences as such:
grapes > apple > orange
This relationship, which embodies the well known logical property of tran-
sitivity, was formalized into a fundamental axiom, known as General Axiom
of Revealed Preference (GARP ; Houthakker, 1950). In the same years, de-
velopments such as von Neumann and Morgestern work on game theory and
expected utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945) expanded the
scope of GARP including further assumptions and lead to a formal and quan-
titative framework which has been fundamental in neoclassical economics for
the years to come. Quantifying utility, in particular, helped solving the prob-
lem of giving an actual value to the options for a decision-maker 2. The core
2A thorough review of value theory in economics and philosophy goes beyond the central
scope of the present thesis. For a clear survey of the field, I recommend the Stanford Ency-
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assumptions of this model of human behavior, the so-called homo economicus
were laid in those years.
This axiomatic approach has been extremely popular for its quantitative
rigor and simplicity. In fact a great improvement over the speculative ap-
proach is represented by the quantitative dimension, which allowed to make
predictions and provide a formal way to conceive rationality. The epistemo-
logical bases of this approach are discussed by Milton Friedman in his work
on positive economics (Friedman, 1953) and his idea suggests that it does not
matter how individuals behave in reality, as long as their aggregate behavior
can be usefully accounted for by the higher-level (macroeconomic) theories.
This conception maintained (a sort of philosophical instrumentalism; Guala,
2006) that individuals behave as if they are maximizing their utility functions,
obeying the central axioms of the homo economicus conception.
Although we can argue that the axiomatic approach has been an improve-
ment over the previous speculative approach, there are still a number of lim-
itations in the face of determining how people do choose in real life. First,
it admittedly lacks a mechanism3 that would explain how choices are made,
both at the neurological level (how choices are implemented by the brain) and
the cognitive level (which are the representations at stake?). Second, although
predictions were possible, they were largely ignored, not only at the individual
level - which was not the focus of economists anyways - but also the aggregate
clopedia of Philosophy (SEP) page on the topic: Schroeder (2016) as well as the excellent
book on economic thought by Blaug (1997). For our purposes we will just consider utility
as a way to measure the value of an item for a decision-maker.
3The notion of mechanism (Machamer et al., 2000) as an explanatory device has been
extensively explored in philosophy of science. For a good introduction to the debate I
recommend Marraffa and Paternoster (2013).
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level, where it was just assumed that people would behave in a rational way
(Friedman, 1962). After all, the axioms were considered to be reasonable as-
sumptions about behavior that did not needed to be scrutinized or be put to
test (Samuelson, 1966).
1.2.3 Empirical approach
1.2.3.1 Behavioral Economics
As empirical evidence on real choices started to accumulate, it became more
and more clear that the set of assumptions that were held at the core of the
axiomatic approach used so far had to be, at best, revised. Pioneering work in
the ’50s by Maurice Allais on risky choices (Allais, 1953) and Herbert Simon on
the behavior of business managers (Simon, 1955), among others, highlighted
the limits of human rationality and brought to the foreground a wealth of
systematic biases in reasoning. A systematic approach to the study of human
decision-making can be found in the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In their work they integrated ideas
from experimental and cognitive psychology, such as the concept of mental
representations (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1985). They emphasized the
role of heuristics, that is rule-of-thumb shortcuts to decisions that do not
need complete information. In particular, their work on the effect of how
information is presented on decisions - i.e., framing - is worthy of mention.
To give an example, consider you are faced with the following dilemma (asian
disease problem; Tversky and Kahneman, 1985):
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Imagine that your country is preparing for the outbreak of an un-
usual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that
the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs
are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Most people, but not all, will pick program A here. After all the prospect of
saving 200 people is appealing, right? However, imagine you were presented the
choice a little differently, like this (as it was the case of half of the participants
of the original experiment):
If Program A is adopted 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
The two scenarios presented have the same, identical, consequences, only
framed differently, in the first case in terms of gains and in the second case in
terms of losses. The effect of this simple difference in presenting the informa-
tion is striking: in the original experiment Tversky and Kahneman found 72%
of their participants favoured option A if the dilemma was framed in terms of
gains, while this percentage dropped to roughly 22% if the dilemma was pre-
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sented in terms of losses (with, conversely, 78% participants accepting option
B in the loss framing, Tversky and Kahneman (1985)).
This example shows that the set of assumptions of the axiomatic approach
had to be revised, to incorporate heuristics and cognitive distortions (i.e.,
biases) that affect decision-making. Moreover, they demonstrated that the
way in which information is framed matters when making choices 4.
Notwithstanding the success of this new, empirical, approach to study
decision-making (prospect theory and the heuristics and biases research pro-
gram Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), whose
most important contribution to the study of choices is the use of actual lab-
oratory experiments, we can still find some limitations. First, while mathe-
matically solid, this approach falls short of providing a mechanistic account of
how choice is implemented. Indeed, it provides only a formal way - i.e., utility
maximization or some form of cost optimization - to predict how people would
choose given a set of preferences, reasoning and information constraints, with
limited attention to computational models (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Vranas,
2000), unlike other empirical approaches to decision-making (e.g., Gigerenzer
and Brighton, 2009), but similar to the aforementioned axiomatic approach
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945). Second, preferences are exogenously
determined 5, that is they are assumed to be given (i.e., external) to the choice
process, and not varying in time, for instance, even following a mere change
in physiological state, such as being tired or hungry (e.g., Bossaerts and Mu-
4This aspect will be relevant in my work presented here (see chapters 2 and 3).
5This is a common assumption in Rational Choice Theory (Green and Fox, 2007), a fairly
widespread theory about human behavior in microeconomics.
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rawski, 2015; Dietrich and List, 2013). In order to address these issues, some
economists felt the need to turn to the emerging tools of neuroscience and in-
vestigate whether biological constraints of choice models would help face these
issues, shedding light onto the mechanisms at play in decision-making.
1.2.3.2 Neuroeconomics and Decision Neuroscience
This convergence between neuroscience and economics took years to fully de-
velop and give birth to a new discipline: Neuroeconomics (Glimcher and Rus-
tichini, 2004). At its core is the idea of decisions as algorithm-based processes
in which information is elaborated. If neurons do process information, then
it is clear that hypotheses on mental processes happening during decision-
making can be tested relying on neural data, i.e., a mechanistic approach.
Neuroimaging tools such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have managed to capture the
interest of behavioral economists for their potential in uncovering the underly-
ing processes of decision-making, how they unfold in the brain and how their
outcomes can be manipulated, in real time. A larger and clearer picture on
how we do make decisions, learn and adapt in a changing environment started
to emerge (Rangel et al. (2008), Figure 1.1), together with models of learning
originally developed in animals, such as reinforcement learning (see Sutton and
Barto, 1998).
Some successes of this approach include the discovery and subsequent
manipulation of utility values that are hypothesized in the axiomatic ap-
23
Figure 1.1: Decision-making flow-chart. Adapted from Rangel et al., 2008.
.
proach (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Rolls and
Grabenhorst, 2008, e.g.,), and helping discriminate between different valuation
models (Levy and Glimcher, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011, e.g.,). Furthermore
significant amendments to classical utility theories have been proposed. These
include the discovery that, under particular circumstances, choices under risk
are better explained by models where the subjective weighting of risk does not
follow expected utility theory predictions (mean-variance models) Christopou-
los et al., 2009 rather than utility models. Other examples include the work
by Barbaro et al. (2017), who showed that valence can better drive object
representation accuracy in the brain when compared to utility.
In recent years the idea of biology merely imposing constraints on economics
models of decision-making, so typical of neuroeconomics, is being challenged
(Bossaerts and Murawski, 2015). This emerging approach, named decision
neuroscience puts biology center-stage and proposes that biology offers more
24
than constraints in the implementation of formal models (Shiv et al., 2005) 6.
It can be argued that not only biology, but also experimental psychology and
cognitive neuroscience can offer more than simple constraints to economics
models of decision-making. This can emerge more clearly if we focus on a
special case of decision-making whose complexity and centrality in our lives
encompasses a wide range of factors, from physiology to society, such as food
choice. In fact, I hope to show that, in spite of its complexity, we can try to
break it down along its relevant dimensions with a range of analytic tools, such
as behavioral testing, computational modeling and neuroimaging.
1.3 Food Choice
A complex and important model of choice is food choice (Rangel, 2013). Its
multifarious nature escapes simple models of choice in that personal, socio-
economical and cultural factors all shape the decisions (Mela, 2001; Rozin,
2006; Shepherd and Raats, 2006, Figure 1.2). Food is arguably the fuel that
shaped our evolution (Wrangham, 2009), fostering cooperation among males in
hunting (Bowles and Gintis, 2004, 2011; Skyrms, 2004) and that feeds our com-
plex brains (Pontzer et al., 2016), as well as shaping complex social practices
(Delormier et al., 2009). Food is so important for our survival that convincing
evidence of its own peculiar representation in the brain exists (Rumiati and
Foroni, 2016). The ecological importance of food choice is paramount as diet-
related diseases, such as obesity, represent an increasing concern for global
6A few examples in this direction are reviewed in Boureau and Dayan (2011) and Pearson
et al. (2014).
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health (NCD-RisC, 2017), as well as the global effects of food consumption
on climate change (McMichael et al., 2007) and environmental sustainability
(Pullman et al., 2009).
1.3.1 Relevant dimensions
Figure 1.2: Food choice complexity.
There is a vast literature on the topic, and most studies rely on single fea-
tures that influence food choice. A few ways to organize food choice along a
set of key dimensions have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Rozin, 2006;
Shepherd and Sparks, 1994). At the center of these models we typically find
factors that are related to the food, such as physiological aspects (Figure 1.2,
top). We can consider these fundamental as they provide the motivational
impulse to eat (hunger and energy content). In turn, these physiological el-
ements influence, on a higher level, what the authors call person-related and
socio-economic factors. Among these we find the main dimensions of affect
(Figure 1.2, bottom left) and cognition (Figure 1.2, bottom right): the first
one influencing preferences and attitudes towards food, the second determining
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how food is categorized.
1.3.1.1 Physiology
Calories and edibility. Physiological aspects are very important when it
comes to food as normally they provide the impulse to eat in the first place
(Berthoud, 2011). Among these, calories take on a primary role, as they pro-
vide the energy that ultimately allows our organism to function. Given the
importance of calories, it is no wonder that food with a high quantity of them
can have a special representation in the brain. More specifically, foods with
high calories have been shown to be processed differently from low-calorie
foods, activating reward-related areas such as the ventral striatum and hy-
pothalamus (Killgore et al., 2003). In line with this idea, high calorie foods
would also tend to be more craved while on a calorie-restraining diet (Gilhooly
et al., 2007). Given the importance of calories as a fuel for the brain and
the body, this is not surprising, as extracting information about calories in
a reliable way (Toepel et al., 2009) in an uncertain environment represents a
clear evolutionary advantage helping secure food for survival and reproduction
(Lieberman, 2014).
Furthermore, there is also evidence that not only high-calorie, but trans-
formed food, that is food which thanks to a chemo-physical transformation is
able to provide more calories and different nutrients, is categorized differently
by our brain (Pergola et al., 2017). Evolutionary speaking, cooked - and hence
transformed - food can be thought of as an important element in support-
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ing the growth of our energy-thirsty brains (Pontzer et al., 2016; Wrangham,
2009).
Foods with more easily available calories would also tend to be more salient.
Given the importance of vision for mammals and humans in particular, it
comes to no particular surprise the importance of color in conveying infor-
mation about nutrients and edibility (Clydesdale, 1993). The ability to dis-
criminate red-green colors, a characteristic of trichromatic vision, has been
shown to be advantageous in foraging ripe fruits and younger leaves, which are
normally redder in hue, in many primates species (Dominy and Lucas, 2001;
Jacobs, 2009; Lucas et al., 2003; Osorio and Vorobyev, 1996; Regan et al.,
2001). This adaptation appears to be preserved in humans. As Foroni et al.
(2016) showed, red-colored food items significantly elicit higher arousal than
green-colored ones. Green food items were also perceived to be less calorie
richer than redder ones, even when calorie content was controlled for.
All in all, calories are important determinants of food choice in that they
provide the energy we need to function and reproduce. As a consequence of
this, calorie-rich foods are perceived as more salient and have spurred adap-
tations in perception, such as color signaling, and in motivation, such as in-
creased drive to consume transformed foods. Considering the importance of
this life-serving function, it is expected that we have evolved cognitive and
bran mechanisms to detect and process calorie information.
Hunger. However, once calories are successfully detected, they would not be
ingested by themselves without capitalizing on the motivation to do so. Indeed,
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hunger and thirst can play this role by prioritizing the choices depending on
the state of need of the organism (e.g., proteins; See Griffioen-Roose et al.,
2014). As the popular saying goes, hunger can be considered the best spice
(Reisenman, 2014). Piech et al. (2010) exemplified this by using a visual
target detection task with random food cues and distractors. They found that
hunger significantly altered the attentional focus of participants during target
detection. As this effect was not present when participants were satiated, it
suggests a selective effect of hunger on attentional focus when it comes to
food. Along the same line of evidence, di Pellegrino et al. (2010) investigated
whether sensory-specific satiety, i.e., decrease in reward value of an item once
it has been consumed up to satiety, would affect subjects’ attentional focus.
As they managed to show using a visual probe task, both pleasantness ratings
and focus decreased with sensory-specific satiety for that food, but not for
other foods.
As shown by Siep et al. (2009), hunger can modulate brain activity in
reward-related areas such as medial OFC, insula, caudatus and putamen while
interacting with the calorie content of foods. Indeed, while hungry their par-
ticipants showed higher activity for high calorie foods in these areas, while
when satiated, this happened for low calorie foods. This differential effect
of hunger is interesting and is in line with other studies, such as Read and
Van Leeuwen (1998), who found that hungry participants would choose more
high calorie foods when hungry. Although on satiated participants only, Char-
bonnier et al. (2015) were also able to find that participants would choose more
quickly low calorie than high calorie foods.
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Hunger plays indeed such an important role in prioritizing calorie intake
that there is evidence suggesting it can override preference for certain foods
when others, less preferred, are more readily available (Hoefling and Strack,
2010). Furthermore, hunger does seem to interact with affective elements such
as stress. Born et al. (2010) had their fasting subjects perform either a stressful
or non-stressful task in two separate sessions in the lab. After the task they
had to select their breakfast in the MRI scanner and they were scanned twice,
one before and one after food intake. Interestingly, their participants tended,
overall, to favor foods that were richer in proteins and carbohydrates when
stressed, compared to when they were not stressed. Moreover they found that
stress seemed to decrease the reward value of food items, as found in the lower
activation of amygdala, hippocampus and cingulate cortex.
Altogether, hunger reflects the need of an organism to obtain calories and
promotes behaviors accordingly. It not only affects attention by increasing the
focus toward food that can provide needed nutrients but also seems to modu-
late preferences towards particular foods based on the contextual situation as
well as interact with the state of stress and urgency of the organism.
1.3.1.2 Affect
The aforementioned studies seem to suggest that affective aspects constitute
an important dimension of food choice. There is, in fact, a wealth of evidence
on the effects of mood and emotion on food choice, such as the case of stress
or comfort eating (Griffin et al., 1993; Oliver and Wardle, 1999; Oliver et al.,
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2000; Pool et al., 2015; Zellner et al., 2006). Interestingly, also the converse
phenomenon, that is the effects of food choice on mood and emotion, has at-
tracted the attention of research in recent years (Gibson, 2006, 2012; Spencer
et al., 2017). Most of these effects, however, are related to the actual con-
sumption of food more than the process of choice itself (e.g., Macht et al.,
2003).
Preference. Among the different aspects included in the affective dimension,
we will address food preference, with a focus on how genetic and environmen-
tal aspects shaped its development (Ko¨ster, 2009), including early exposure
(Garcia et al., 2001; Mennella et al., 2001), and sometimes remarkable stabil-
ity throughout the years (e.g., Nicklaus et al., 2004). As already mentioned,
axiomatic models of decision-making, as well as empirical ones have long con-
sidered preferences as exogenous, that is, stable over time. However, evidence
is mounting in that not only food preference develops and changes through
time, but it can exhibit transitory changes with simple re-exposure or contex-
tual - i.e., framing - effects (Le´vy and Ko¨ster, 1999; Mojet and Ko¨ster, 2002).
Other studies have shown that food preferences can also be manipulated in chil-
dren (Birch and Marlin, 1982; Wardle et al., 2003) through exposure. Mere
exposure effects, in fact, (Zajonc, 1968) seems to impact preference formation
and choice, with pre-exposed alternatives being either chosen more often (Bird
et al., 2012) or considered for a shorter time (Glaholt and Reingold, 2011).
This effect has been found and replicated for food items, as well. For instance
Fedoroff et al. (1997) found that exposing both unrestrained and restrained
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eaters to food cues (pizza) had an impact on subsequent food intake on un-
restrained eater, while it produced an urge to eat pizza in restrained eaters.
Similarly, exposing college students to different drinks significantly impacted
their preference ratings on them, with the best ones for drinks that were tasted
more (Pliner, 1982). The mere exposure effect, however, does not seem to
act equally on items with different valence, with neutral and pleasant items’
ratings being influenced while unpleasant not, as shown with chemo-sensory
preferences (Delplanque et al., 2015). Food preference can interact with other
dimensions such as, for instance, physiological factors. As shown by Spence
et al. (2015), for instance, in environments that are rich in high calorie foods,
preference seems to be the most important factor in shaping choice. Moreover,
while being satiated does not impact preference ratings, hunger seems to lead
the choice towards more high calorie food items with a significant alteration of
preferences, suggesting a secondary role of affective factors (Finlayson et al.,
2007).
Preferences are not born in a vacuum, however. Social norms and habits
are a powerful determinants of preferences, especially when social emotions
such as shame or disgust can influence practices of food consumption, acting
as sort of implicit enforcers of norms without the need of a central authority
(Croker et al., 2009; Rozin, 1996). An example of this can be considered the
customary eating practices of religions such as islam (halal) or judaism (kosher)
that, although applied in some countries, do not need a central authority to
do that (Mukhtar and Mohsin Butt, 2012; Wu et al., 2014).
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Taken together, affective processes include a variety of phenomena that
influence food choice on different levels. These include motivational aspects
(i.e., mood and stress), changes in the importance of different food items for
the decision-makers (i.e., preferences) and changes in the context in which
foods are consumed as well as the habits governing the eating process (i.e.,
social norms).
1.3.1.3 Cognition
While physiological and affective factors provide the motivational backbone
to the making of food choices, cognitive aspects provide a form of top-down
control on them. Wealth, social factors, personal and safety concerns about
food can all contribute here. Besides the obvious impact of price on food
choice, with lower prices increasing consumption of foods (extensively studied
in marketing and economics. See French, 2003; Giskes et al., 2007; Horgen and
Brownell, 2002; Steptoe et al., 1995), other relevant cognitive aspects of food
choice include dieting and food restraining practices, not only in the general
population but also considering special cases such as athletes and restrained
eaters. While their reasons might differ and involve different degrees of emo-
tional aspects (e.g., physical shape vs. body image concerns), both populations
include a strict control of food choice and intake, with heightened awareness of
food composition and health issues (Heaney et al., 2011; Tepper et al., 1997).
How information about food is provided matters as well. In line with
the results of framing on choice in general (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985),
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how the food is labeled seemed to have a significant impact on choice and
intake. For instance, Just and Wansink (2014) found that how the portion
of food was labeled (either “small” or “large”) influenced consumption and
willingness to pay with higher bids and less consumption for foods that were
labeled as “large”, regardless of the actual size of the portion. Whether the
food is labeled as “healthy” or “tasty” also seems to impact choice, as people
would tend to choose more food when the first item they consume is labeled
as “healthy” as compared to “tasty” (Finkelstein and Fishbach, 2010). As
they authors contend, this might be due to the perception of “healthy” as
mandatory and not rewarding. Healthy cues seemed to improve healthy food
choices as compared to tasty (and unhealthy) foods as shown by Hare et al.
(2011). In their study, they showed that having participants focus on the
healthiness of a food as compared to its tastiness influenced their choice pattern
towards healthier foods.
How attention is focused, in fact, seems to be crucial in driving choice.
Fixation time can be considered as a useful proxy for visual attention, which
undergoes both top-down and bottom-up control mechanisms (Orquin and
Loose, 2013). Stimulus-driven attention seems to play an important role in
driving the choice process, with several studies focus on different aspects that
affect the likelihood of choosing an item over others. Indeed saliency (Bialkova
and van Trijp, 2011; Orquin et al., 2012; Mormann et al., 2012), surface size
(Chandon et al., 2009; Orquin et al., 2012), position (Chandon et al., 2009)
and visual clutter (Visschers et al., 2010) all produce noticeable effects in the
choice. In line with this idea, Krajbich et al. (2010) investigated whether gaze
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fixation patterns would influence food choice in healthy participants. Using
eye-tracking measures and computational modeling they managed to show a
direct relationship between fixation time and choice, with a pattern of accu-
mulation of information towards the option with the more extended fixation
time. Moreover, they observed that the last option being fixated was predic-
tive of the actual choice. This model represents an improvement with respect
to previous hypotheses about the gaze fixation (e.g., the gaze cascade hypoth-
esis Shimojo et al., 2003). However, while the link between the accumulation
of information and choice seems to be backed up by other studies in the lit-
erature, the authors’ predictions have not been confirmed for what concerns
gaze allocation time being a causal factor in determining choice (Nittono and
Wada, 2009; Orquin and Loose, 2013). As Orquin and Loose (2013) conclude,
in commenting the down-stream effect of attention on decision-making:
“The observations suggest two underlying processes behind down-
stream effects: a soft evidence accumulation process, which leads to
higher choice likelihood for longer exposed alternatives, consistent
with the mere exposure effect, and a bottom up attention capture
process reducing the likelihood of nonattendance, i.e., that the al-
ternative is ignored in the decision process” (Orquin and Loose,
2013, p.201).
Risk. Despite not posing a large threat such as in the past, another un-
doubtedly important factor determining food choice are safety concerns, such
as food poisoning or contamination. Building upon a large literature on dual-
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processing systems (Epstein, 1994; Evans and Frankish, 2009; Sloman, 1996),
some authors have proposed that our brains deal with risky prospects relying
on two different mechanisms (Slovic et al., 2005). One, cognitive, brings logic
and reason to assess and manage risk (risk as analysis, Slovic et al., 2004).
The other, affective, refers to the fast, automatic response to a situation that
brings potential danger (risk as feelings, Loewenstein et al., 2001). According
to these authors, when it comes to risk, most people would rely on an “affect
heuristics”, which entails that “people base their judgments of an activity or a
technology not only on what they think about it but also on how they feel about
it” (Slovic et al., 2004, p.315). According to this theory, “if a general affective
view guides perceptions of risk and benefit, providing information about bene-
fit should change perception of risk and vice versa”(Slovic et al., 2004, p.315).
This is in line with studies finding that, despite risks and benefits being pos-
itively correlated in the reality, they tend be negatively so in the way people
perceive them (e.g., Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Fischhoff et al., 1978). We
could thus argue that how risk is framed influence reactions and evaluation of
danger. Indeed, this conjunction of cognitive (framing) and affective (e.g., gut
reactions) aspects make risk an important element in decision-making. Food
is no exception in this aspect, as understanding the interplay of cognitive and
affective elements of risk in the case of food poisoning and contamination can
shed light on how these factors are taken into account when making decisions
about public safety.
Up to date, most studies in this direction have focused on public perception
and awareness of contamination issues (Liu et al., 1998; Rosati and Saba, 2004),
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but not many on food choice per se. Still largely unexplored, however, is the
mechanism underlying the decision processes when it comes to food that can be
contaminated, as well as how the brain integrates the information concerning
hazard and nutritional properties of the food.
All in all, cognitive aspects of food choice mostly focus on how the informa-
tion about food is elaborated and how this interacts with the other dimensions
(i.e., physiology and affect). While framing seems to impact on how foods
are perceived in terms of their benefits for the organism (i.e., healthiness), the
attentional focus influences how information on foods is acquired and thereby
the choice. Moreover, how risky the food is perceived to be for the organism
shapes choice by altering preferences and choice patterns.
1.3.2 Food choice in the lab
I have given in the previous pages a brief overview of the current state of the
literature on food choice. While these studies show we have an idea of how
different factors interact in shaping food choice, we still lack an overarching
picture. One that can benefit from actual models of how the process of food
choice unfolds and which psychological and neuroscientific mechanisms it em-
ploys, still largely unknown to date despite a not so small amount of knowledge
on the phenomenon itself (Shepherd and Raats, 2006). Conceptual models are
still the mainstay in the food choice literature (e.g., Furst et al., 1996; Macht,
2008), and the lack of a computational approach, compared to other fields of
decision-making (e.g., Rangel et al., 2008) is striking. On top of this, what
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is also lacking is a way to quantify uncertainty. Given the profound context-
based nature of food choice, research on the topic could greatly benefit from
approaches assessing model reliability, an important example being Bayesian
Statistics (Gelman et al., 2014).
There are, however, a few examples of work using this type of approach.
These studies do not focus on food choice per se, but only as a specific instance
of value-based decision-making, leaving aside most of the complexity that con-
cerns food choice (Krajbich et al., 2015; Mormann et al., 2010; Towal et al.,
2013). Mormann et al. (2010) for instance, investigated whether time pressure
would affect food choice in a binary forced-choice task according to the predic-
tions of a computational model (drift-diffusion model, Ratcliff, 1978). While
they were able to find that a particular version of their model accounted best
for the responses under different time pressures, it is clear from their study
that food choice was not their main focus. Stimuli, in fact, were not matched
for variables of interest but were simply familiar to the participants. However,
the use of computational modelling allowed them to track specific task-related
variables onto different processes, allowing to quantify the relationship between
the two variables.
One of the strengths of these approaches is the use of binary forced-choice
paradigms, which allow to tightly control stimulus features, while allowing
enough computational power to test complex models of behavior, with some
limited sacrifice in terms of generalizability. Another is the fact that they
can account for uncertainty, a key aspect in food choices, given the many
38
determinants that simultaneously can affect the process.
1.4 Research Aims
In the effort of characterizing how physiological, affective and cognitive factors
shape food choice, I designed three studies. My goal was to uncover some of
the neural and computational bases of cognitive mechanisms that are at play
when we choose among different foods, by maintaining a central focus on food
choice. To achieve this, I used a forced-choice design, a binary food-choice
(henceforth, BFC) paradigm that allowed to control for stimulus variables
while keeping the analysis computationally tractable and preserve some of the
ecological validity of the actual choice. Furthermore, I employed functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) alongside behavioral testing and compu-
tational modeling, taking advantage of different levels of explanation (e.g.,
biological, computational, cognitive, behavioral. Bechtel, 2008, 2009; Craver,
2007).
In Study 1, I investigated the interaction between cognitive and physiologi-
cal aspects, focusing in particular on how people understand and judge calories.
In order to do so I made participants perform a BFC task with foods that dif-
fered along the total number of calories (i.e., portion size, caloric content here)
and the number of calories specific to that food (i.e., food type, caloric density
here) asking them to maximize their calorie intake. I expected this would re-
sult in participants not only choosing foods with high calorie density but also
bigger portions (higher caloric content) overall. As these two measures have
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often been conflated in the literature, I hoped to show that both dimensions
affect how calories are understood and how they both bias choices.
In Study 2, I aimed at uncovering the neurocognitive basis of a particualr
case of food choice, that is risky food choice. Given the interplay between
cognitive-affective (contamination risk) and physiological (calorie) aspects, it
represents a model of the interaction among the different dimensions of food
choice. In Study 2, I expected risk to strongly influence the choice and that
participants would forego most of the benefit of gaining calories. At the neural
level, I expected the activation of the insula to track risk prediction, while the
vmPFC to code for the reward value (i.e. its calories) of the options.
In Study 3, I wanted to address the interplay of hunger, calories and prefer-
ence using a computational approach that could disentangle the simultaneous
and combined contributions of each of these elements to food choice. In or-
der to do so, I employed a drift-diffusion modeling approach to information
accumulation in favor of either one or the other option of a within-subject
BFC, depending on the features of the food chosen. I expected that partici-
pants, while hungry, would choose food relying more on their calories (caloric
density), while they would rely more on preference and less on calories in the
condition in which they were not fed.
Taken together, with these studies I aim at showing that the neurocognitive
bases of food choices include a complex interplay of factors that can be inves-
tigated in an experimental setting. On top of this, I aim to demonstrate that
the we can propose and test mechanistic models about the process of choice
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focusing on different, controllable factors, drawing a bridge from value-based
decision-making work in cognitive neuroscience and the literature on food per-
ception and choice in consumer research and experimental psychology.
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2. Counting calories
1
2.1 Abstract
Calories provide the fuel needed by our brain and body to work. However,
to my knowledge, no author has hitherto clarified how people conceive and
interpret calories, whether as an absolute (i.e., total number) or a relative
(i.e., related to the type of food) quantity. This is important, as calories
provide our brains not only with important nutritional information about foods
(Nesheim and Nestle, 2012) but also influence our behavior in choosing among
different foods. In the present Study, I investigated how this is categorized
by asking 23 participants to maximize their caloric intake in a BFC task with
food items either differing in the number of total calories (caloric content) or
calories x 100g (caloric density). What the results show is that participants
tend to understand calories in term of their relative quantity (caloric density),
with little regard to the total number of the calories suggesting, in line with
other studies (Frobisher and Maxwell, 2003; Japur and Diez-Garcia, 2010),
1A version of this chapter is in preparation for publication: Garlasco P., Corradi-
Dell’Acqua C., Foroni F. & Rumiati R.I. The effect of Risk on Food Choice: Understanding
the caloric determinants of food choice and the effect of risk of contamination.
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that estimates of portion sizes can be biased.
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2.2 Introduction
By and large neuroscientists have investigated the perceptual features of food
that might guide our choices in everyday life (Verhagen and Engelen, 2006).
For instance, the ability to detect food caloric value is of paramount impor-
tance because we must be able to modulate our food intake depending on our
energetic needs. Several studies succeeded in tracking food processing in the
brain as a function of calorie content (e.g., Toepel et al., 2009). However, a
possible caveat remains since, to our knowledge, no author has hitherto in-
vestigated whether it is the type of food or the total amount of calories in a
portion - in other words how calories are framed - that drives the estimation
process (e.g., Frank et al., 2010; Killgore et al., 2003; Tang et al., 2014; Toepel
et al., 2009).
As some studies showed, portion size - and in particular meal size - can
have a biasing influence in estimating the calorie content of a particular food
(Wansink and Chandon, 2006), including the known effect of considering a
portion smaller when the plate is larger as compared to when the plate is
smaller (Figure 2.1,Van Ittersum and Wansink, 2011, named Delboef illusion
after the eponymous optical illusion Delboeuf, 1865). Also, the calorie content
of a food can bias the estimation of the total number of calories of a portion
(Japur and Diez-Garcia, 2010), even to the point that increasing a portion of a
food leads to higher energy intake through increased consumption (Rolls et al.,
2004a,b).
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Moreover, while some studies have shown that many factors such as food
liking, familiarity, expected satiation (Brogden and Almiron-Roig, 2010), gen-
der, dietary behavior and hunger (Brunstrom et al., 2008) seem to influence
portion size estimation, it is unknown whether it is the calories contained in
the portion (say a bowl of ice cream vs. a spoon of ice cream) or whether the
calories of a certain type of food (that fact that it ice cream or pasta) that
would be wrongly estimated.
Understanding which of these two options is preferentially processed, there-
fore, has implications on how the brain encodes calories, since both ways can
be interpreted as a reward (i.e., energy content). Furthermore, we know that
cognitive aspects - such as framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985) - are rel-
evant in decision-making in general (as explained in section 1.2.3.1) and food
choice is no exception, as studies in consumer science (Carels et al., 2007) and
cognitive neuroscience (Hare et al., 2011) have shown.
In this Study, we aimed at understanding the relative contribution of two
caloric variables - Caloric Content (CC) and Caloric Density (CD) - in making
a choice about food. CC is defined as the total amount of calories in a portion
(e.g., 160Kcal of chocolate), and CD corresponds to the amount of calories in
100 gr of a particular type of food (e.g., 515Kcal/100g in the case of chocolate)
might differently affect food choice. In order to better understand how calories
are understood, I decided to ask participants the explicit goal to maximize
them. If, notwithstanding the goal, participants would focus more on CD, as I
would expect from studies on portion sizes Diliberti et al. (2004); Frobisher and
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Figure 2.1: The Delboef illusion applied to portion size. As you can see for
yourself (top Figure) the size of the dish can influence the size of the same
portion. Adapted from Van Ittersum and Wansink (2011).
Maxwell (2003), then it would mean that the type of food matters more than
the total amount calories, making estimates of the total number of calories of a
portion (CC) biased, with significant implications for overeating (Rolls et al.,
2002).
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2.3 Materials & Methods
2.3.1 Participants
Participants were recruited through internet advertising. Prior to testing, they
all provided written informed consent and were informed that they could dis-
continue the study at any time and upon completion of the experimental
tasks. Twenty-eight (16F; Age: 24.38yrs, SD = 3.2) healthy, right-handed,
normal body-weight (Body mass Index (BMI): 21.49, SD = 1.95) and normal
or corrected-to-normal vision native Italian speakers, participated in the study.
All the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were con-
trolled for satiety and thirst via pre-test questionnaires. Table 2.1 summarizes
the sample features. All participants but five had an omnivorous diet, were
non-restrained eaters and had no eating-disorders as assessed via the Restraint-
Scale (Ruderman, 1983) and the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI-3, (Garner,
2004)) post-questionnaires. Therefore, data were analyzed for twenty-three
participants.
Participants’ information
Age Education BMI
mean 24.38 15.9 21.49
median 24 16 21.49
SD 3.2 2.37 1.95
Table 2.1: Participants’ demographic and questionnaires’ score. BMI = body
mass index; PSQI = Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; RS, Restraint Scale.
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2.3.2 Stimuli
Forty food images were taken from a purposefully-made database, aimed to be
a continuation of the work on FRIDa (Foroni et al., 2013, see Figure 2.2). Half
of them (n=20) were depicted high caloric density (HCD: 324Kcal/100g, SD
= 130,) foods and the other half (n=20) depicted low caloric density (LCD,
50.85Kcal/100g, SD = 18.25) foods. Within each subset (HCD and LCD),
half of the stimuli had high (HCC, 160Kcal) and low caloric content (LCC,
80Kcal), producing four stimuli subsets (HCD-HCC, HCD-LCC, LCD-HCC,
LCD-LCC). Food stimuli were matched for variables of interest such as arousal,
typicality, hedonic value, familiarity, valence, RGB color and spatial frequency.
(Foroni et al., 2013).
Figure 2.2: An example of selected stimuli. Low caloric density (LCD) foods
on the left side and High caloric density (HCD) foods on the right; foods with
low caloric content (LCC) in top quadrants and foods with high caloric content
(HCC) in bottom quadrants.
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2.3.3 Task procedure
To untangle the contribution of either CC or CD in estimating the caloric
intake of a given food, a binary decision task (binary food choice, BFC) was
implemented. Participants had to choose between pairs of foods with differ-
ent CC or CD. Participants were instructed to maximize their caloric intake
in making their choices. The task was divided in four runs, with breaks in
between. A short training phase to help participants to get acquainted with
the setup and the stimuli used preceded the experiment.
Each trial was structured as follows: after a small fixation period (1000ms)
participants were presented with two food images on the screen. They pressed
either the “1” key or the “2” key to choose the left food or the right food
respectively. Participants had up to 5s to make their decision. After decision
was made, a feedback on the amount of calories gained was provided through
a self-filling bar. Participants were instructed to maximize their caloric intake
in making their choice (see Figure 2.3). Stimuli were presented electronically
using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
In order to identify the contribution of the single feature of interest, we
compared the caloric content (CC) and the caloric density (CD), each of which
was then divided in two levels: High and Low. In the case of CC, the quantity
(i.e., the total number of calories) was either 160Kcal (High) or 80Kcal (Low).
Given that different foods could hardly have the same CD, the two CD lev-
els corresponded to a range of values: up to 150Kcal/100g for Low and from
150Kcal to 600Kcal for High, with no values overlapping. These criteria were
50
Figure 2.3: An example trial in Study 1.
in line with previous literature (Foroni et al., 2013) and allowed us to distin-
guish between foods having High CD and Low CD values. While there clearly
were differences in the CD within the same category (high or low), however,
these were considerably smaller as compared to differences between categories
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, W = 36, p = 0.002). All the levels combined
produced a factorial design (2x2) with two conditions of two levels each. In
diffCD, stimuli had the same CC but different CD; within this condition, half
of the trials had high CC while the other half had low CC. Conversely, in dif-
fCC, stimuli had the same CD but different CC; within this condition, half of
the trials had high CD while the other half had low CD. Furthermore, Control
was included as a control condition in which stimuli were taken from the same
“group” - each group represented by a panel in Figure 2.2, giving a total of
4: LCD-LCC, HCD-LCC, LCD-HCC, HCD-HCC - and had the same CD and
CC values. This condition was devised to control whether the item choice was
balanced, i.e., participants would be choosing randomly between items within
the same category. The experiment was divided in four runs with 46 trials
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each, for a total of 184. diffCD and diffCC consisted of 60 trials each, while
the Control condition had 64 trials.
2.3.4 Data Analysis
Data were analyzed via a binomial linear mixed model using the statistical
package lme4 (Bates et al., 2014). Since not all conditions carried a correct
answer (foods having the same CC have, by definition, the same amount of
total calories, as in condition diffCD) we chose to use as dependent variable
the side of the chosen item (Left vs. Right). As independent variable we
split the conditions in the following five levels (summarized in Table 2.2):
1) Condition 3 with foods taken from the same group (given that in this
condition participants chose between items of same CC and CD, we expected
comparable amount of left/right responses); 2) and 3) conditions with foods
from Condition 1 (same CC, different CD), with the item of higher CD located
on the left and right sides on the screen, respectively; and 4) and 5) conditions
with foods from Condition 2 (same CD, different CC), with items with higher
calorie content located on the left and right sides of the screen, respectively. As
additional regressors, the model included participants’ age, gender and BMI.
In the analysis, we considered a significant threshold alpha level of 0.05. All
statistical tests were two-tailed.
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level variable
DV Left vs. Right
1 Control condition
2 diffCD - left
3 diffCD - right
4 diffCC - left
5 diffCC - right
Table 2.2: Study 1 Linear Mixed Model structure. DV = Dependent Variable.
2.4 Results
As indicated by the intercept value (i.e., the Control condition, 0.51, Table 2.3)
the experiment was well balanced, as participants chose randomly between
items of the same group. Age, gender and BMI did not seem to drive the
choice, not reaching significance (see Table 2.3: p = 0.971, p = 0.588 and
p = 0.123, respectively. See also Figure 2.4). Moreover, CD seems to have
had an effect on the participant’s choice. As it can be seen in Table 2.3 and
Figure 2.4, the effect in the case of Condition 1 was significant (p < 0.001), as
CD contributed to drive the choice either to the left (0.10, p < 0.001) or the
right (−0.15, p < 0.001) with respect to the control condition (intercept, see
Figure 2.4). A small effect can be observed also in Condition 2 (Condition 2
L: −0.07, p = 0.040) but only on the left and with a large error bar, while in
the case of Condition 2 R it was not statistically significant (0.05, p = 0.072,
see figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Plot of the linear mixed model estimates for fixed effects. In dark
gray the Condition 1 and in light gray the estimates for Condition 2. All values
are compared against the value of the intercept (Condition 3).
Model
Beta Confidence Interval (CI) p value
Fixed Effects
(Intercept) 0.51 0.44 − 0.98 < .001
Age 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 0.791
Gender −0.01 −0.06 − 0.03 0.588
BMI −0.01 −0.02 − 0.00 0.123
DiffCC 2, L 0.05 0.00 − 0.10 0.072
DiffCC 2, R −0.07 −0.15 − 0.00 0.037
DiffCD, L 0.10 0.05 − 0.15 < .001
DiffCD, R −0.15 −0.21 −−0.09 < .001
Random Effects
Nsubjects 23
Observations 3131
Table 2.3: Binomial logistic regression predictors for Study 1. The intercept
represents the estimate for the Control condition.
2.5 Discussion
In this experiment we investigated how using different notions of calories, i.e.,
Caloric Content (CC, total number of calories) and Caloric Density (CD, num-
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ber of calories per 100 grams of food), influenced the participants’ understand-
ing of calories and food choice. This was achieved by employing a design in
which participants were asked to maximize their caloric intake with binary
choices. Stimuli were paired according to their high or low CC, and high or
low CD, and controlled for possible confounds such as arousal, valence, typi-
cality, familiarity and perceptual features such as color and spatial frequency.
This produced a factorial design plus an additional control condition (Condi-
tion 3) in which stimuli were matched for both CC and CD and expected to
be randomly chosen.
When asked to maximize their caloric intake, participants chose food based
mostly on CD. To our knowledge, our study is the first to show that type of
food (CD) but not the total number of calories (CC) matters in the evaluation
of the calories of a food. Previous studies have also mostly focused on CD but
did not assess whether CC was a confounding factor or not. For instance, in
Killgore et al. (2003) study, high and low calorie foods loosely corresponded
to what here we called high and low calorie density (CD) foods, and in Tang
et al. (2014) CD but not CC was investigated (but see also Frank et al., 2010;
Siep et al., 2009; Simmons et al., 2005, for other studies in which CC was not
taken into account).
The fact that calories are intended as a relative and not as an absolute
quantity seems to be in line with what found by other studies. Japur and
Diez-Garcia (2010), for instance, investigated the ability of nutrition students
to estimate the size of a portion given pictures of different foods. As the
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authors report, only a small minority (18.5%) of the estimates was correct
(more or less than 10% of the actual quantity). In particular, they found a
significant positive correlation (r = 0.8166; p = 0.0002) between calories (CD,
in our case) and portion size estimation. The higher the CD, the more it was
overestimated. As the test was performed with nutrition students, one would
speculate that lay people would make even bigger mistakes, or perhaps retain
a similar bias. This is indeed what has been found in other studies on different
populations (e.g., Frobisher and Maxwell, 2003, in adults and children), with
the same pattern of overestimation for foods with higher CD. One could argue
that these results are not really comparable, as estimating portion size (grams)
is different from estimating the total number of calories. However, as some
simple algebra shows, the first can be derived from the latter and vice versa,
using CD:
CC(cal) =
portion(g)
100
∗ CD(cal/100g)
While I do not expect participants to perform this small calculation, I think
we can safely assume that our brain might engage in some similar computa-
tions, explaining the pattern of results in the present study. In order to test
this explanation explicitly, though, further studies targeting directly the es-
timation process would be needed. Other studies involving food choice and
consumption with different portion sizes seem to help explaining our results.
For instance, Diliberti et al. (2004) investigated whether people would eat more
food by (covertly) increasing on different days of the week the portion of pasta
that they consumed regularly in the cafeteria. As their results show, people
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would tend to consume more calories, as they not only eat all the (larger) pasta,
but kept on purchasing the same other foods they would normally buy along
it (e.g., main course, dessert). Moreover, when asked whether they found they
had consumed more food, the participants were generally unaware of having
consumed more calories. Other authors replicated the experiment by giving
either medium or large popcorn portions to moviegoers. Even though the por-
tions were so big that nobody managed to finish them, still participants who
had the large portion ate 45% more (Wansink and Kim, 2005). Other studies,
such as Rolls et al. (2002), found that whether the subjects were either served
a plate or had to help themselves from a serving-plate, their consumption in-
creased as the portions increased. These results seem to suggest that portion
size can be largely irrelevant to the actual choice and consumption of food2.
Our study expands this clam by showing that even when the goal is to explic-
itly trying to maximize the calories the portion does not seem to matter more
than the type of food that is chosen. From an evolutionary point of view, one
could imagine that our ancestors’ brains that were better in estimating calories
of the type of food they found (or hunted) would have been selected3, while
CC or the portion size would have mattered less. After all, as the cafeteria
studies show, eating more is always the best strategy when food is scarce.
Notwithstanding the implications, as for most studies also this study is
not free from limitations. The first one is related to the difference in within-
2And can also explain why we so easily fall prey to the food version of the Delboeuf
illusion.
3Imagine you had the choice to go picking different varieties of nuts but could not get all
of them. I bet being able to estimate their CD would far better than trying to put together
a total number of calories by using different types of nut.
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category variability between CC and CD. As a matter of fact, it is very unlikely
to find two different food items with the same CD. Indeed, the only case we
have here is the one of whole-grain bread and raw ham (see Appendix A).
On the contrary, it is easier to find a portion with the same amount of CC,
as the total number calories can be, for instance, prescribed in a diet. The
fact that CC varied with only two values (80 and 160 Kcal) instead of varying
slightly clearly factors a limitation, but it is, I believe, unlikely to alter the
results significantly, as the order of magnitude of the mistakes in estimating
the size of portions in the aforementioned experiments show (e.g., Frobisher
and Maxwell, 2003). A second limitation stems from the fact that it is not
always possible to control for all variables of interest when selecting stimuli.
All the more so with food images, which are fairly complex visual stimuli. This
is the reason why controlling for some low-level variables, such as luminance or
contrast (Kohn, 2007), was not done. While it could be argued that controlling
for these variables would have rendered the images less ecological it remains
the fact that not enough is known about how which neurocognitive process
underlies calories estimation to rule out the possible effects of these variables.
This is a limitation that is partially related to the construction of the database
itself, but also a choice, as it would have implied not being able to control for
other variables such as Arousal or Valence, elements which were considered to
be more important for the scope of the experiment.
As I hope to have shown, the framing of calories - that is whether they
are understood as CD or CC - matters when choosing a food item. As the
calories appear to be perceived as a relative quantity, the type of food seems
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to matter more than the total number of calories, whose estimation can to be
easily biased and hardly be reliable. Indeed, the fact that CD is mostly used as
an estimator for the calorie intake, shows how important it is to control for CC
and portions, and this can have a profound impact on calorie consumption and
overeating (Rozin et al., 2011). Although this experiment does not evaluate
the role of other factors - e.g., affective aspects such as food preference - in
shaping food choice, nonetheless it rules out a possible confounding factor that
might bias results in experiments evaluating the role of calories in food choice.
It will serve as a starting point for the other Studies included in the present
thesis.
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3. Contamination and risky food choices
1
3.1 Abstract
Every day we choose what to eat and in order to do so we evaluate food items
along several dimensions. Due to the complexity of the food-supply chain,
food safety might become an issue. Indeed, contamination can occur and this
represents a real risk for consumers. Here, we aimed at assessing the neural
bases of how the perception of risk contamination alters choice of foods with
different CC or CD. To this end, we had 19 healthy participants with normal
body mass index (BMI) repeatedly choose among two food items of different
caloric content while lying down in the scanner. Analyses were performed
using a linear mixed model with binary logistic regression and flexible factorial
second-level fMRI analysis. First, we found that with risk probability being
equal, participants chose high CD foods more frequently than low CD. This
behavior was associated with the right anterior insula (rAI), while activation
in the dorsal striatum varied parametrically with risk. The general tendency
1A version of this chapter is in preparation for publication: Garlasco P., Corradi-
Dell’Acqua C., Foroni F. & Rumiati R.I. The effect of Risk on Food Choice: Understanding
the caloric determinants of food choice and the effect of risk of contamination.
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to avoid risk was partially counterbalanced by an increased approach towards
foods with high CD, suggesting that this type of food might reduce people’s
concern toward contamination. The activation of rAI is in line with other
studies showing its role in risk perception and prediction errors, while the
dorsal striatum has been found to code for reward value suggesting a different
perception of the calories of the food. Altogether, these results shed light on
the behavioral and neural bases of risk perception in food choice.
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3.2 Introduction
As efficiently as our brain seems to extract critical information about food from
perceptual cues, food choice requires the acquisition of further information
about what we intend to eat. Indeed a food, even a very palatable one, may
be poisoned, and therefore eating it may have serious or fatal consequences
to our health. Given this, it is not surprising that we are very sensitive to
perceptual cues that can indicate that the food we are about to consume is
spoiled or poisoned. A bitter taste, sour smell or bluish color indeed provide
our brain with cues that can be readily interpreted as a sign of danger and are
usually met with a reaction of disgust (Martins and Pliner, 2006; Rozin and
Fallon, 1987). Even when none of the perceptual features of food is sufficient
to alarm us, ingesting the food is usually sufficient for our brain to evaluate
the danger of the item consumed, however at the cost of harming us.
Different is the case where our assessing of the state of the food must rely on
other sources of information. Public perception of risk has changed as progress
in biotechnology has transformed the way we produce, store and distribute food
(Savadori et al., 2004). Like other aspects of communication, risk can also be
framed in different ways. And as we have seen in the introduction (section
1.2.3.1), the effects of framing (for instance in terms of gains or losses) can
produce large effects2. Indeed, based on a pool of 136 studies, Ku¨hberger
(1998) analyzed whether framing had an effect on risky choices. What the
2However, this is not always the case. In their review Levin et al. (2002) show that
while framing seems to work for attributes and risky choice, results for goals are weak and
inconsistent.
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author found was that the effect size was low to moderate, with variations
depending on the design, instructions and focus of the outcomes (reference
point vs. goal). Experimental research on risky choices, however, mostly
focuses on monetary gains and losses and, to my knowledge, the research on
risk in food choice is scant or not existent (with the exception of work in
non-human primates: Platt and Huettel, 2008). On the other hand, most
of the research on how we evaluate and discard foods that might be poisoned
is primarily focused on public perception of contamination hazards (e.g., Liu
et al., 1998; Rosati and Saba, 2004), leaving unexplored the neurocognitive
mechanisms underneath the choice process. Indeed, there seems to be no
research on the trade-off between calories and contamination in food choice
and, in particular, how it is modulated by different types of food (CD) or by
the total number of calories (CC).
In this Study, I investigated how food choice interacts with the risk of an
averse consequence (i.e., risk of contamination), potentially altering the value
of the food item, and the brain mechanisms that may drive the choice. In or-
der to do so, I employed a BFC, building on Study 1. Following the design by
Hunt et al. (2012), I decided to pair the food items with discrete probabilities
of contamination and use as the reward the CD of the food. Consistently with
the literature on framing, I expected that risk would have a general averse
effect on the choice. This would imply that participants would rather refrain
from choosing a food than risk being poisoned3. In fact, I expected partici-
pants to try and minimize the poison by choosing the safest option (a strategy
3This highlights an asymmetry between gains and losses. See section 3.5 for a discussion.
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known in decision theory as minimax, Von Neumann, 1959. A sort of “in-
surance against the worst case”, (Robert, 1994)). On top of this, I expected
that if CD influenced the choice, it would be by making high CD items more
salient and attractive, and participants would choose at least some of them.
This would show that the type of food is an important attribute in deter-
mining whether people would perceive it as safe in case of contamination. In
line with the results of Study 1, I did not expect to find any effect of CC
on the decision patterns. Despite the fact that I could not find any study
on risky food decision-making, I expected risk to activate the insula, usually
found in prediction-error and risky decision-making (Preuschoff et al., 2008) to-
gether with the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), proposed to code for risky aversion
(Christopoulos et al., 2009), thereby extending the results of risky decision-
making to a different type of stimulus, i.e., food. Moreover, I would expect
to find the activation of the insula, usually tracking the CD of foods (Verha-
gen and Engelen, 2006). If the “common currency” hypothesis of value-based
decision-making is true4, I would also expect to find an activation in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), putative hub of the comparison process
of options with different values (Levy and Glimcher, 2011).
4This hypothesis states that, in order to decide which item to choose we need to compare
its value with others and after the comparison is made select the one with the highest value
(Levy and Glimcher, 2011; Rangel et al., 2008).
65
3.3 Materials & Methods
3.3.1 Participants
Participants were recruited through internet advertising. Prior to testing, they
all provided written informed consent and were informed that they could dis-
continue the study at any time. Nineteen, right-handed, normal body-weight
(Age: 25yrs, SD = 3.5, BMI: 22, SD = 1.7, Education: 16.05yrs, SD = 2.78),
Italian native-speakers participated in the study. All the participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were hungry as they were asked to
fast before the experiment. All but one had an omnivorous diet, were non-
restrained eaters and had no eating-disorders as assessed via the Restraint-
Scale(Ruderman, 1983) and the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI-3, Garner,
2004) post-questionnaires. Therefore the final analysis involved 18 partici-
pants. able 3.1 summarizes the sample features.
Participants’ information
Age Education BMI
mean 25 16.05 22
median 25 16 22
SD 3.5 2.78 1.7
Table 3.1: Participants’ demographic and questionnaires’ score. BMI = body
mass index; PSQI = Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; RS, Restraint Scale.
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3.3.2 Stimuli
The 24 stimuli selected for Study 2 were taken from Study 1 and were matched
for variables of interest such as arousal, typicality, hedonic value, familiarity,
valence, RGB color and spatial frequency. (Foroni et al., 2013). The risk of
contamination took six different probability values (0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%
and 100%) and each food had an associated value that was consistent within-
subjects but randomized between-subjects. The number of probability values
chosen represented a trade-off between having enough probability combination
while at the same time not increasing too much the number of trials, as the
trial length in the fMRI scanner was longer and the time constrained (see
section 3.3.3). The conditions were the same of Study 1 (diffCD, diffCC and
Control).
3.3.3 Task procedure
Participants arrived at the venue 20 minutes before the experiment and were
asked to fill-in two pre-experimental questionnaires to control for their state
of hunger and their handedness. Hence each participant’s expectation was
framed by reading one of three written stories about a realistic natural dis-
aster altering the state of the cultivations and food supply, and subsequently
answered different questions about how to cope in such a circumstance (e.g.,
“Which food would you avoid in these situations?”). This kind of framing has
been shown to be effective in significantly altering consumer’s behavior in cir-
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cumstances of scarcity and hopefully would work in case of danger, where food
would be scarce (see Shah et al., 2015). Hence, participants were instructed
about the task which was the same as in Experiment 1 (see also Hunt et al.,
2012). They were presented with pairs of food items, with the respective as-
sociated probability of contamination (risk) displayed underneath the image.
Participants had to choose one of the two foods in order to maximize their
caloric intake while minimizing the amount of poisoned food they could get.
Participants had up to 4s to make their choice, a time window that a sepa-
rated pilot study (n = 6) showed was long-enough in order to decide. In case
they did not succeed to choose on time, no food item was selected for that
trial. A feedback bar was displayed after each trial, increasing only in case of
a safe-food choice with an amount correspondent to the calories of the chosen
food. A choice was considered safe depending on the probability of the food
being contaminated (e.g., a food having 40% risk probability would be safe
in 60% of the cases). Every time the bar reached the end point it eventually
got back to start, adding bonus food gained, which was given as snack bars to
the participant after the experiment was completed. In order for the incentive
to be effective, participants were asked to abstain from eating for 90 minutes
before the experiment (Killgore et al., 2003). As in Study 1, stimuli were
presented electronically using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Each participant had a total of 198 trials (72 for diffCD, 60 per diffCC,
plus 66 for Control condition) to perform, divided into 66 trials per run. Each
run lasted approximately 12-13 minutes with a total scanning time of approx-
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imately 50 minutes per participant. After the experiment, participants were
asked to fill three different questionnaires: a restraint-scale, an eating disorder
inventory, and a questionnaire about the preference for the food stimuli used,
including liking and frequency of consumption.
3.3.4 Scanning parameters
Scanning occurred on the premises of Azienda Ospedaliero-Universitaria “Santa
Maria della Misericordia” in Udine from May to July 2015. The scanner used
was a Philips Magneton Achieva 3T. TR was set to 2s, TE to 35ms with a
FOV of 230x230x136 and a FA of 90°. Voxel size was 3mm x 3.59mm x 4mm.
An MPRAGE sequence was performed after the functional runs in order to
acquire high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images for coregistration.
3.3.5 Behavioral data analysis
Unless otherwise mentioned, the analysis of participants’ choices was the same
as in Study 1. The only difference in the model consisted in the addition of
the difference in Risk of the two options as factor, parameterized in 11 levels
(from -100 to +100), corresponding to the difference between the risk of the
left food and that of the right food. As an example, if a banana on the left
had a 40% probability of being contaminated and a chocolate bar had a 80%
probability, the difference would be 40 − 80 = −40.
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3.3.6 fMRI data analysis
Functional data were analyzed using SPM12. Preprocessing steps included
motion-correction algorithms with an exclusion criterion of 1mm of head mo-
tion in any direction (no participant exceeded it). Subsequently, data were
preprocessed with high-pass filtering (128 s) and then co-registered to the
anatomical T1 image. Images were resliced to 3x3x3 mm using sync interpo-
lation and then normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.
Smoothing was performed with a Gaussian kernel filter (full width half maxi-
mum (FWHM) = 8). Preprocessed data were subsequently fitted into a Gen-
eral Linear Model (GLM) using as regressors all the conditions of interest
(diffCD, diffCC and Control) and motion-related regressors were included to
rule out any effect of motion on the data. For each condition its time deriva-
tive was additionally modeled. Additionally, two regressors were added for
the activity related to the feedback, one for safe choices (Safe) and one for
not safe choices (Unsafe). A last parametric set of regressors was used to
keep track of risk in each condition. I modeled the moment of the choice as
well as the feedback phase. A flexible factorial model was performed on the
first-level betas and planned second-level t-tests of contrasts of interest were
subsequently assessed. Namely, I was interested in disentangling the effect of
varying CC or CD on risk performance. To do so, I contrasted separately
the calorie conditions (diffCC > diffCD, diffCD > diffCC) and each of them
against the control condition (diffCD > Control, Control > diffCC, diffCD >
Control, Control > diffCD). The effect of risk was computed in two different
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ways. First, I assessed the difference between the risky options, by using the
absolute value of the difference between the two options (Risk Abs diff). The
absolute value was used to keep track of the difference between the two risk
values regardless of which one was eventually chosen. Second, to assess the
contribution of the general level of risk involved in the choice, I also computed
the risk as the mean of the two options, regardless of their difference (Risk
Mean). This is consistent with the view that the difference between two risky
prospects is not evaluated in the same way whether the risk is high or low
(e.g., Christopoulos et al., 2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1985). All statistical parametric maps were corrected for multiple
comparisons using a FWE-cluster correction (Friston et al., 1994)5.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Behavioral. Averse effect of risk, small effect of
CD.
As it is shown in Table 3.2, participants performed at chance level in the control
condition (0.53), suggesting that the control was effective. As expected, no
effect of age, gender or BMI on performance was observed. Furthermore, the
effect of liking and frequency of consumption was not significant (see Table 3.2
and Figure 3.1). As expected, risk seemed to induce a general averse effect on
5Previous studies have confirmed that this type of cluster correction, combined with a
smoothing kernel of 8mm, produces a percentage of false positives below 5% (Flandin and
Friston, 2016).
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the pattern of choices (−0.6, SD = 0.3, p < 0.001), confirming the hypothesis
that participants become generally risk averse when the mere possibility of
contamination is at stake. Interestingly, both a main effect and an interaction
were present in the case of diffCD (−0.05, p = 0.019; 0.1, p = 0.040) while
this was not true for diffCC, suggesting that the CD, that is the type of food,
might exert a different effect in counteracting the general effect of risk.
Figure 3.1: Plot of the linear mixed model estimates for fixed effects. In
dark gray the diffCD and in light gray the estimates for diffCC. All values are
compared against the value of the intercept (Condition 3).
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Model
Beta Confidence Interval (CI) p value
Fixed Effects
(Intercept) 0.53 0.49 − 0.57 < .001
Age 0.00 −0.00 − 0.02 0.521
Gender 0.02 −0.07 − 0.11 0.691
BMI 0.00 −0.02 − 0.02 0.941
Liking 0.04 −0.03 − 0.11 0.247
Consumption −0.01 −0.08 − 0.05 0.703
diffCC, L 0.01 −0.03 − 0.05 0.630
diffCC, R −0.01 −0.05 − 0.04 0.760
diffCD, L 0.02 −0.03 − 0.06 0.446
diffCD, R −0.05 −0.09 −−0.01 0.019
Risk 0.53 0.49 − 0.57 < .001
Risk: diffCC, L −0.05 −0.15 − 0.06 0.411
Risk: diffCC, R 0.06 −0.05 − 0.16 0.320
Risk: diffCD, L 0.10 0.00 − 0.20 0.040
Risk: diffCD, R 0.03 −0.07 − 0.12 0.603
Random Effects
Nsubjects 18
Observations 3462
Table 3.2: Binomial logistic regression predictors for Study 2. The intercept
represents the estimate for the Control condition.
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3.4.2 fMRI. Right anterior insula and pre-SMA activa-
tion.
The second level flexible factorial analysis allowed to contrast the effect of the
different conditions of interest through planned post-hoc t-test contrasts. Most
notably, I tested whether differences existed between the caloric conditions (1
and 2) and the control condition. The only contrast that yielded a robust,
FWE-cluster corrected (p < 0.05) activation was when contrasting the trials
where CC was varied and CD kept constant (diffCC), against the trials where
CD was varied and CC kept constant (diffCD). As apparent in Table 3.3 and
Figure 3.2, two extensive clusters around the right insula and the pre-SMA
were more active for diffCC when compared with diffCD.
Figure 3.2: diffCC > diffCD contrast activation for the second-level flexible
factorial analysis. A) You can see highlighted the clusters around the right
insula (anterior and posterior) and the pre-SMA (in the sagittal image) as well
as their parameter estimates (B and C).
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Cluster Coordinates T value Area
size (MNI) (peak)
diffCC > diffCD 269 36, 2, -1 5.17 Right Insula
133 -21, 2, 56 4.77 Pre-SMA
Table 3.3: Regions that showed higher activation while contrasting diffCC >
diffCD.
Cluster Coordinates T value Area
size (MNI) (peak)
diffCD > Control 251 18, -25, -7 4.94 Dorsal Striatum
183 57, -7, 41 4.25 Pre-motor cortex
104 -42,-10, 26 3.95 Ventral pred-motor
Table 3.4: Absolute Risk: Regions that showed higher activation while con-
trasting diffCD > Control.
3.4.2.1 Absolute risk difference. Risk-related activation in dorsal
striatum and pre-motor cortex.
When parametrized using the absolute difference between the two options, risk
survived the multiple comparison correction (FWE cluster size) when contrast-
ing diffCC against the control condition. Four clusters of activation were found
in the Dorsal Striatum, pre-motor cortex (PMC), corpus callosum and ventral
pre-motor cortex (vPMC, see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4).
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Figure 3.3: diffCD > Control contrast activation in the parametrized Absolute
Risk for the second-level flexible factorial analysis. A) The highlighted clus-
ters are around the dorsal striatum and the premotor cortex as well as their
parameter estimates (B and C).
3.4.2.2 Mean of the two risks. Risk-related activation in left PCC.
When parametrized using the absolute difference between the two options, risk
survived the multiple comparison correction (FWE cluster size) in the diffCD
> Control contrast. A significant activation cluster was found in the posterior
cingulate area (see Figure 3.4 and Table 3.5). This area has been found to be
positively correlated to the perception of physical risk (Qin and Han, 2009) and
its activation supports our behavioral finding that risk is perceived differently
in the CD and control conditions.
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Figure 3.4: diffCD > Control contrast activation in the parametrized Mean
Risk for the second-level flexible factorial analysis. A) You can see highlighted
the cluster in the left PCC as well as their parameter estimates (B and C).
Cluster Coordinates T value Area
size (MNI) (peak)
diffCD > Control 167 -9, -55, 2 4.34 Left posterior cingulate -
Retrosplenial cortex
Table 3.5: Risk Mean: Regions that showed higher activation while contrasting
diffCD > Control.
3.5 Discussion
In this Study, I investigated how the perception of risk contamination affects
human choices about foods with different calories. To assess the effect of risk, I
introduced a probability of contamination associated with each stimulus (coun-
terbalanced between subjects) ranging from 0%, safe, to 100%, poisoned. This
event-related fMRI design allowed to disentangle the contribution of different
brain areas to the processing of risk probability as well as its interaction with
the caloric value (either CC or CD) of the food items.
In addition to an expected general averse effect of risk, I also found both a
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main effect for diffCD and an interaction of risk with diffCD. This supports the
idea, in agreement with other studies (see e.g., Frank et al., 2010; Nummenmaa
et al., 2012), that high calorie foods act as powerful rewards not only in obese
and overweight but also in individuals with normal BMI. More importantly,
the result has been obtained after controlling for the size of the portion (CC),
allowing us to attribute it to the effect of caloric density alone. The main
finding, however, is that CD seems to exert a partially counteracting effect
when associated with the risk of contamination, reducing its averse effect.
Importantly, this effect was not found for CC. Figure 3.5 schematizes the view
on how food choices are influenced by food characteristics (CC and CD) in the
event of food contamination (risk). Risk exerts an effect both directly on choice
and indirectly through CD. Moreover, while Study 1 clarified that participants
can also judge food calories by relying on CC, with no information about risk
of contamination, in Study 2, when risk of contamination is factored in, there
is no evidence that CC plays a role.
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Figure 3.5: A mechanistic model of the effect of Risk, CD and CC on food
choice. Risk influences CC, CD and choice; CD in turn influences choice, while
CC does not.
The fMRI results were able to distinguish a set of areas that are arguably
affected by risk and calories processing. The contrast between diffCD and
diffCC highlighted both the right anterior insula (rAI) and the pre-SMA. The
activation in these areas should represent the different effect on risk on the two
caloric measures of interest (CC and CD). In fact, in the trials of diffCD, where
CD was varied, the rAI was deactivated. In other words, rAi is activated more
when the absolute calories are tracked rather than when the relative calories
(CD) are.
Activation in the anterior insula has consistently been linked to the pre-
sentation of food cues in different modalities, including vision (Rolls, 2007;
Simmons et al., 2005; Small, 2010). The anterior insula has also been associ-
ated with risk prediction and prediction errors (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rao
et al., 2008). I suggest that a lowered activation in the rAI might be related
to the reduced risk perception of CD. A hypothetical mechanistic explanation
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considers the putative role of anterior insula in representing not only risk but
risk prediction error (Preuschoff et al., 2008), with the purpose to help the
organism to adapt and learn fast the risk of an option with constant updating,
while comparing the real outcome with the predicted one and using the error
to fine-tune the evaluation process to the new stimuli. The difference in activa-
tion when comparing choices in diffCD and diffCC suggests that risk might be
perceived more correctly, and updated accordingly, when two foods differ in CC
(diffCC) than when they differ in CD (diffCD). On the other hand, pre-SMA
activation has been found in association with action decision and preparation,
especially when participants made their choice under time pressure (Forstmann
et al., 2008), as well as with working memory tasks (d’Esposito et al., 1998;
Pessoa et al., 2002; Petit et al., 1998). This might imply that making decisions
in diffCC was more demanding than in the diffCD, and that this extra process-
ing effort was due to the presence of risk. Taken together, the deactivation of
rAI and activation of pre-SMA suggest that risky decisions about foods equal
in total number of calories (i.e., same CC) but different in caloric density (i.e.,
High CD vs. Low CD) are easier to make. I hypothesize that the brain pays
less attention to the probability of contamination here, with the task being
easier (lower pre-SMA activation) and less risky (deactivation of rAI).
The possibility that risk could have differently been perceived with foods
of different CD seems to be consistent with the activation of the dorsal stria-
tum, pre-motor cortex (PMC) and left posterior cingulate (lPC) tracking the
absolute difference of the risk and its mean. The dorsal striatum has been
frequently found to be involved in reward computation and anticipation (e.g.,
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Schur et al., 2009) even in the context of food (Rothemund et al., 2007). Its
involvement has also been observed in coding for the magnitude of both actual
reward and punishment, particularly for the latter (Delgado et al., 2003). Its
activation seems to be consistent with the literature on the first representing
value of options of negative valence (Balleine et al., 2007). Since risk of con-
tamination is clearly averse, it could be treated as a sort of punishment, and
its presence when contrasting CD with the control condition, suggests that,
since in the Control condition the calories are similar, it might make the neg-
ative outcome more salient, driving the choice away from CD. The activation
of PMC and deactivation of dorsal striatum in diffCD – the latter found to
be involved in action-contingent learning, especially with appetitive stimuli
(O’Doherty et al., 2004) – here might signal the higher difficulty in learning
to associate options with high reward to different levels of risk, although this
evidence is hard to interpret. Even taking into account the effect of risk as the
mean of the two options (Risk Mean) the activation of the left posterior cingu-
late (lPC) seems to be consistent with its role in tracking subjective physical
danger (Qin and Han, 2009), since the higher the overall risk, the higher this
risk irrespective of the choice.
What I could not find in the results is the activation of IFG and vmPFC. A
possible explanation for the lack of activation in IFG, which should be expected
in line with Christopoulos et al. (2009), can be that the contrasts performed
did not allow to highlight a general averse effect of risk, as all the conditions I
had included risk and, as they were counterbalanced, they probably cancelled
out in the averaging process. On the other hand, the lack of activation of
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vmPFC can be arguably related to the possibility of participants not actually
comparing the options in term of their values. This opens the possibility for a
different mechanism, one that relies on the probability of contamination as a
main factor shaping the choice, with the possible, secondary, contribution of
CD to decide whether to choose one item of the other. However, this is mostly
speculative, and further studies would be needed to clarify this point.
The Study presented here has many limitations and a few biases. The first
bias could derive from the use of few stimuli, affording a reduced variability
and generalization of the results. Unfortunately, given the constraints of the
fMRI design, the reduced number of stimuli was a compromise, as even adding
two more stimuli per group (each with a different probability) would have
implied 122 more trials to balance all the comparisons. Another bias could
stem from the fact that, as in Study 1, not all the possible confounds were
accounted for (see section 2.5). Another limitation can stem from the fact
the task demanded to compare two very different things (calories and risk of
contamination) and there it is not clear as to what would be the strategy
employed to calculate the optimal outcome. One option would be to calculate
the expected value (EV, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945), multiplying
the calories and the probability of obtaining them (that is, 1 - the probability
of the item being contaminated). However, it is not clear how the negative
consequence of eating contaminated food could be computed, and this is clearly
a limitation in the design. Another limitation is that I used only one framing
option. Future studies could investigate whether different framing scenarios
could influence the task. One interesting option would be to contrast the risk of
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contamination framing with a simple mathematical game with probabilities to
win food items. The difference in how probabilities are treated in the two cases
can provide interesting insights in how the brain handles risk and reward in
two very different context and determine what is specific about the perception
of food safety.
Taken together, these results confirm that risk of contamination is highly
averse: the higher the risk, the more it is considered akin to personal harm
(lPC). When the choice involves foods with different caloric density, however,
things get more complex. The type of food and arguably its history of posi-
tive reinforcement can partially counteract the negative effect of risk, making
certain foods look more attractive and therefore perceived as less risky (rAI),
hence lowering the cognitive load of the choice (pre-SMA). In this case, the
difference between the two foods could be perceived as more salient and risk
playing a larger role in discarding the item with lower CD (Dorsal Striatum).
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4. Accumulating information of calo-
rie, hunger, and preference to make
food choices
1
4.1 Abstract
Decision-making theories have long explained decisions as based on perfectly
rational value assignment, the decision strategy of the homo economicus. How-
ever, decisions based on affectively relevant stimuli, such as food items, hardly
follow strictly rational heuristics. Being hungry, the food’s caloric content and
subjective preferences are known factors to modulate food choices. Yet, how
these factors relatively and altogether contribute to the food choice process is
still rather unknown. Here, we ask 16 healthy young adults to choose among
800 food image pairs when satiated or hungry. The food items belonged to a
low or high-calorie density (CD) subgroups and their preference was assessed
1A version of this chapter is under review in Cognitive Science: Garlasco P., Parma V.
& Rumiati R.I. Hunger, calories and food preference predict food choice: a computational
model.
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for each participant. To simultaneously link the hunger state, the CD of the
food and their preference to the probability of subsequently choosing each item,
we applied a novel computational model, the hierarchical drift diffusion model
(HDDM). Results indicated that hunger, preference and calorie all affected the
speed of the food choice. The choice was faster towards low CD foods when
participants were fed and the food items were highly preferred. Conversely,
the choice was faster towards high CD foods when participants were hungry
and the foods were less preferred. All in all, these findings confirm the complex
nature of food choices and the need for nuanced computational models able
to account for multifaceted decision-making and value assessment processes,
such as those regarding food.
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4.2 Introduction
Accounting for multiple decision factors and ruling out the non-relevant noisy
information is argued to depend on a process called Bayesian Causal Inference
(Rohe and Noppeney, 2015), which consists in an estimate of the probability
of a cue based upon prior information and weighted by the current evidence.
Choice models have often capitalized on a family of models called drift-diffusion
models (DDM, Ratcliff (1978)). In a Bayesian framework, such models allow
to quantify the speed of the decision process based on other factors, such
as accuracy (e.g., Cavanagh et al., 2011; Vandekerckhove et al., 2011). The
DDM models assume that the subject is accumulating evidence for each of two
alternatives (i.e., two food items), until a threshold for a decision (i.e., food
choice) is met. Compared to classical frequentist analyses, these models allow
to quantify uncertainty based on the data and an informed prior distribution,
instead of relying on a theoretical (usually Gaussian) one. Furthermore, they
allow for the possibility to consider simultaneously, with different parameters,
the speed of the accumulation of information (drift-rate, v) and the point at
which the decision is made (threshold/boundary, a), a possible pre-existing
bias towards one of the two options (bias, z) and also non-decision related
components of the task (non-decision, t). Indeed, this approach favors the
joint investigation of critical aspects of the choice, rather than separating them
into different models (as the frequentist approach calls for).
A handful of studies has employed DDM to study specifically food choice.
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Krajbich et al. (2010) presented participants with food snacks in a BFC and
investigated how fixation patterns can contribute to the choice of one of them.
Both first gaze direction and total fixation time speeded up the accumulation
of information towards one of the two foods, contributing to the final food
choice. These data were extended by Towal et al. (2013) who investigated
whether and how bottom-up (perceptual salience) and top-down (subjective
value) processes influence fixation patterns and food choice. Their results in-
dicate that the fixation patterns modulate choice primarily in accordance with
the food item value, but also based on perceptual salience, again confirming a
complex interplay between bottom-up and top-down factors underlying even
the most basic food choices. Furthermore, Mormann et al. (2010) consider
whether limiting the decision time affects the way food items are chosen. They
devised a paradigm where subjects chose among pairs of food items randomly
assigned according to their subjective preference. Time constraints facilitated
the choice of preferred foods but made the subjects make more errors, both
elements captured by different model parameters. Still, when instructed to
minimize their choice time (Mormann et al., 2011), participants are able to re-
liably choose preferred food items in BFC with a 73% accuracy in only 404ms
on average, implying that food choice can be a quick and reliable decision
process.
As evident by this short summary of the literature, the DDM approach on
BFC has mostly considered one or two determinants of the decision at a time,
failing to address the complex interplay among the determinants contributing
to food choice which includes hunger, calories and food preference. Also, to our
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knowledge, most studies failed to use a clear-cut definition of calories, relying
on either caloric density (CD) or fat content. Here, we aim to fill this gap
by extending the investigation of the food choice information accumulation
patterns to physiological, i.e., hunger and calorie (CD), and subjective, i.e.,
preference, experiences.
To assess the effect of hunger, calories and food preference on food choice,
we employ a series of DDM: one complete model (hunger x preference) and two
main effect models (hunger only and preference only). To assess simultaneously
the role of hunger and calorie in food choice, we evaluated whether participants
chose high and low calorie food in function of their hunger state (hungry/fed)
and controlling for preference (high/low). We hypothesized that hunger would
affect the boundary position (a), by moving it closer to the starting point
of the drift when the subjects are hungry compared to satiated. This would
mean reducing the amount of information necessary to make the choice when
hungry as compared to when satiated. On the other hand, preference would
influence the bias term of the model (z), indicating whether participants tend
spontaneously to choose low- or high- calorie foods. We expected participants
to choose more rapidly low calorie foods when fed, as found in other studies
run in industrialized countries (Charbonnier et al., 2015). At last, we expected
the calorie content to influence the speed of information accumulation (i.e, the
drift rate, v) in function of hunger. In other words, we expected the drift
rate to be greater when participants are hungry then when they are fed. As
a control check, we did not expect the non decision parameter t to be any
different between the models.
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4.3 Materials & Methods
4.3.1 Participants
Participants were recruited through internet advertising. Prior to testing,
they all provided written informed consent and were informed that they could
discontinue the study at any time. Sixteen healthy (8F; Age: 24.53, SD =
2.85), right-handed, normal weight (BMI: 22.07, SD = 2.44), with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no eating disorder (assessed through the Eating
Disorder Inventory, EDI-3, Garner, 2004) Italian native-speakers participated
in two experimental sessions at the same hour but three days apart from each
other. Participants were omnivorous and had no dietary restriction. They
were all normal weight (BMI, 22.07, SD = 2.44) and unrestrained eaters, ac-
cording to the Restraint Scale questionnaires scores (RS, mean = 11.07, SD
= 5.09, restrainers > 15; Polivy et al., 1988; Nederkoorn et al., 2004). They
also exhibited regular sleep patterns and were not sleep deprived. This was
assessed using the Pittsburgh Sleeping Quality Index (PSQI, 10.69, SD = 3.13,
Buysse et al., 1989; in its validated Italian version, Curcio et al., 2013). Par-
ticipants had to fast (only water allowed) for the 12 hours before coming to
the laboratory. This was done in order for them to be hungry. Fasting time
in the literature ranges from 3hrs (Frank et al., 2010) to 18hrs (Siep et al.,
2009), with behavioral effects emerging already at its lowest end (i.e., 3hrs).
In one session (“hungry” condition) participants had to perform the task with-
out eating, while in the other (“fed” condition) they were offered cereal bars
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to eat up to satiety before performing the task. They were compensated with
e8 per session, e16 in total. Table 4.1 summarizes the sample features. One
participant (ID 2) was removed from final analyses given that her responses
were on average of 0.6s and could not be deemed accurate.
Participants’ information
Age Education BMI PSQI RS
mean 24.53 17.6 22.07 10.67 11.07
median 24 18 22.78 10 10
SD 2.85 1.35 2.44 3.13 5.09
Table 4.1: Participants’ demographic and questionnaires’ score. BMI = body
mass index; PSQI = Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; RS, Restraint Scale.
4.3.2 Stimuli
Forty images were selected from a validated database (FRIDa, Foroni et al.,
2013). Stimuli were divided in two groups of interest based on their caloric
density/100g: twenty of them were low CD (range from 0 to 150 Kcal/100g)
and twenty were high CD (range from 300 to 450 Kcal/100g). Within these
two groups, ten images were salty and ten were sweet, to account for any sweet
tooth or savory preferences, in line with other studies (Mormann et al., 2010,
see Table 4.2). Stimuli were matched for variables of interest such as arousal,
typicality, familiarity and valence (Foroni et al., 2013).
The use of food pictures instead of actual foods is well supported in the liter-
ature. Kringelbach and Rolls (2004) argued that OFC neurons respond more
strongly to the visual modality of foods, while Simmons et al. (2005) found
that food pictures, similarly to real food, activate areas of the primary gusta-
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tory cortex (Right Insula) and areas implicated in reward such as the lateral
OFC.
Low CD High CD
Salty
Sweet
Table 4.2: Examples of the stimuli used.
In order to compare high CD vs. low CD foods, food images were paired
into four different conditions: condition 1 had stimuli of high vs. high (200
trials), condition 2 stimuli of low vs. low (200 trials), condition 3 and 4 had
stimuli with high vs. low and low vs. high (400 trials). The total number of
trials per each session, 800, was in line with previous studies (Mormann et al.,
2010), and was meant to provide enough data points for the DDM to converge.
Stimuli presented were randomly paired using these conditions.
4.3.3 Task procedure
As already mentioned, participants were asked to come to the lab at a pre-
determined time (either 8:30, 9:30 or 10:30 in the morning). Before they began
the experiment, they were offered water and cereal snack bars in the “fed” and
water only in the “hungry” condition. The order of the “hungry” and “fed”
conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Eventually, they had to
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fill questionnaires on sleeping habits (PSQI) as well as rate their hunger, thirst
and tiredness on a 10-point visual analog scale (VAS). The ratings confirmed
that our manipulation between sessions was effective (hunger, p < 0.05; thirst,
p = 0.58, tiredness, p = 0.25).
After this, participants performed the BFC task sitting in front of a computer.
Stimuli were presented on a LCD screen (60 Hz) located approximately 80cm
from the participant using PsychoPy2 (Peirce, 2007)
The task was a food BFC, whereby they were shown pairs of food images and
they had to pick the one they preferred (see Figure 4.1) pressing either the
“z” key for left food or the “m” for right food (this was done to allow enough
physical space between the two keys). Before each trial, participants had to
fixate a cross for a random interval between 1 and 2 seconds. Participants had
a maximum of 3 seconds to make their choices, more than enough as shown by
published literature (e.g., Mormann et al., 2010). After this amount of time
was elapsed without a key press, the response was considered null. Reaction
times were measured as the time difference between the onset of the images
and the button press. The task lasted approximately 40 minutes, with three
breaks in between.
After the task, participants were asked to rate the food images according
to their preference and frequency of consumption. Eventually, they completed
the other questionnaires, EDI-3 (Garner, 2004) and Restraint Scale (RS, Ru-
derman (1983)). Total time of a session was around 1h-1h15’.
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Figure 4.1: The timeline of the procedure of the experiment for each session
(fasting/fed).
4.3.4 Data Analysis
4.3.4.1 Descriptives
We quantitatively inspected the BFC RTs distributions to assess whether any
participant was either too slow or too fast to be considered reliable. As previ-
ously mentioned, one participant was excluded.
4.3.4.2 DDM Analysis
The analysis was performed using a modified Bayesian version of a drift-
diffusion model: the Hierarchical Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM). A HDDM
employs Bayesian estimation of the model parameters providing a quantifica-
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tion of the reliability of such parameters (Vandekerckhove et al., 2011). Hier-
archical Bayesian estimation allows to constrain subject variability to a group-
level distribution (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014; Regenbogen et al., 2016).
Model fitting Data analysis was performed using the hddm module for
Python3 (Wiecki et al., 2013). In the models, we assumed that the slope of
the drift increased linearly with the difference in hunger and preference between
the two to-be-chosen food items. The upper boundary represented here high
CD foods, while the lower boundary represented low CD foods. A negative
average drift (drift-rate) would therefore indicate a higher number of choices
for low CD food items, while a positive one just the opposite. The bias, instead,
indicated the starting distance from each of the two boundaries. In order to
obtain a 2x2 design we split preference ratings into Low Preference (ratings
from 1 to 4) and High Preference (ratings from 6 to 10). Hence, we estimated
the model a-posteriori distribution of the parameteres by using Monte-Carlo
Markov Chain simulation (MCMC) with gradient ascent optimization, drawing
10000 samples and burning the first 1000 to stabilize the model (Regenbogen
et al., 2016). To allow for convergence analyses, we repeated the simulations
5 times per model (Wiecki et al., 2013).
Model convergence Convergence of the models was inspected both visually
and numerically. We plotted the trace of the models, the auto-correlation and
the mean and distribution of the boundary, drift-rate, bias and non-decision
time (movement) parameters. A numerical estimate of the convergence used
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the Gelman-Rubin Rˆ statistic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992), with values close to
1 indicating a small difference among the estimates of the different distribution
of samples, an index of the reliability of the simulations.
Model testing and comparison In order to assess the reliability in the
difference of the parameter estimates, we calculated the difference in mean
probabilities of the posterior estimates of the conditions of interest (as done in
Cavanagh et al., 2011; Wiecki et al., 2013). Moreover, null hypothesis signifi-
cant testing was performed with a rmANOVA with two within-factors (Hunger
and Preference) and two levels (High and Low). In case of significance, un-
planned bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were performed accordingly (as in
Regenbogen et al., 2016). Model comparison using the DIC (Deviance Informa-
tion Criterion, particularly suited for hierarchical models: Spiegelhalter et al.,
2002) allowed us to compare models including different parameters (e.g., only
hunger vs. hunger & preference), holding into account the complexity of the
model itself as a penalizing factor. With this criterion, lower values indicate a
better fit of the model.Importantly, the values of DIC make sense only relative
to each other, so there is meaningless to compare them with DICs from other
studies (Gelman et al., 2014; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptives
The distribution of RT was not normal and right-skewed, as expected, with an
overall mean of 0.76s and a SD of 0.28 (Kolmorov-Smirnov test, D = 0.65, p <
0.001).
Since the preference ratings were fundamental in our design, we evaluated
whether hunger changed the rated preference across sessions. Such difference
was not significant (Hungry vs. Fed, p = 0.13, Wilcoxon signed-rank test),
allowing us to safely use the ratings of each respective session in estimating
our models.
4.4.2 HDDM
4.4.2.1 Model convergence and comparison
Overall, our models converged satisfactorily. As you can see in Figure 4.2, the
auto-correlation of the last hundred trials was close to zero, as you can expect
from a Markov-Chain that has converged (Wiecki et al., 2013). This means
that the samples are independent draws from the posterior. On the upper left
panel, the trace is plotted as a function of the number of iterations. As you can
see, the iterations do not stray too far away from the mean of the distribution
(which is the point of highest probability of the posterior). The histogram on
the right confirms this.
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Figure 4.2: Convergence plots for a representative node of the model. On the
top left you can see the trace plot, on the bottom left the auto-correlation
while on the right the histogram of the estimates.
Moreover, the Gelman-Rubin statistics (Rˆ) for our models was mostly close
to 1, (mean = 1.0002, SD = 0.0004, for a total of 164 nodes per model)
allowing to infer that different simulations of the same model obtained similar
results, which is considered an index of robustness of the estimation itself.
Overall, estimated non-decision time (parameter t) lasted approximately 0.42s.
This is consistent with our data suggesting that given an average RT of 0.55s,
the participants took approximately 0.1s to decide on most images what to
choose.
Model comparison included all the three models we run (preference*hunger,
preference, hunger). As reported in Table 4.3, the model with preference*hunger
was the most reliable model (22710.46), whereas the hunger model was the one
with the highest DIC and thus the least reliable (25078.55). Given the lower
score of the all factor model, we decided to rely on it to decide in case of
incongruities between different models.
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Models’ DIC
Model DIC
preference*hunger 22710.46
preference 24029.13
hunger 25078.55
Table 4.3: DIC values for our three HDDM. Lowest values represent a better
fit. preference*hunger = model with hunger and preference; preference =
model with preference; hunger = model with hunger.
4.4.2.2 Model results
Boundary Contrary to our expectations, the effect of hunger, preference or
both factors together on the boundary parameter was close to chance level
(50 − 52%, see Table 4.4). A rmANOVA with the two within-factors (Hunger
and Preference) and two levels (High and Low) was not significant (F = 1.06,
p = 0.36). Therefore, the decision threshold for the high and low CD food can
be considered equidistant.
preference*hunger model boundary results
Contrast Probability
Preference
P(Fed - High Pref > Fed - Low Pref) 51%
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Hungry - High Pref) 52%
Hunger
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Fed - Low Pref) 51%
P(Fed - High Pref > Hungry - High Pref) 52%
Interactions
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Fed - High Pref) 51%
P(Fed - Low Pref > Hungry - High Pref) 51%
Table 4.4: preference*hunger model. Probability difference of posterior esti-
mates for boundary (a)
Drift-rate We found a main effect of hunger on the drift-rate. As it can be
seen in Figure 4.3a, participants chose more low CD foods and were overall
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faster in choosing them when fed as compared to when they were hungry, as it
evident from the more negative drift for the fed session (95%). Even preference
alone had an effect on the drift-rate, as displayed in Figure 4.3b. Low CD food
items seemed to be chosen faster when they were highly preferred (more neg-
ative drift), while more slowly when they were less preferred (79%). Including
preference*hunger (preference*hunger model), we could find both main effects
of hunger and preference, as well as their interaction (Table 4.5, Figure 4.3c).
A rmANOVA with the two within-factors (Hunger and Preference) and two
levels (High and Low) was in fact significant (F = 1240.75, p < 0.001). All six
post-hoc tests were significant and survived the multiple comparison correction
(p < 0.01 Bonferroni corrected). As you can see, different sessions seemed to
impact on the speed of information processing as well as on the direction of
the choice. Decisions taken when fed were overall faster towards low CD foods
with a high probability, 98% and 80%, for high and low preference respectively.
Interestingly a different pattern was observed when hungry. In this session,
participants choose overall more high CD items when they had a low prefer-
ence (70%), while high preferred items tended to move the decision towards
low CD (79%). Interestingly, the interaction between hunger and preference
(98%) sped up the accumulation of information in different directions. To-
wards low CD foods with high preference and being fed and towards high CD
foods with low preference and being hungry.
Bias No bias was retrieved in either model (Figure 4.4).
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preference*hunger model drift-rate results
Contrast Probability
Preference
P(Fed - Low Pref > Fed - High Pref) 86%
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Hungry - High Pref) 80%
Hunger
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Fed - Low Pref) 83%
P(Hungry - High Pref > Fed - High Pref) 88%
Interactions
P(Hungry - Low Pref > Fed - High Pref) 98%
P(Hungry - High Pref > Fed - Low Pref) 54%
Sign
P(Fed - Low Pref < 0) 80%
P(Fed - High Pref < 0) 98%
P(Hungry - Low Pref > 0) 70%
P(Hungry - High Pref < 0) 79%
Table 4.5: preference*hunger model. Probability difference of posterior esti-
mates for drift-rate (v)
4.5 Discussion
Food choice is a complex decision that requires the assessment of conflicting
information (Rangel, 2013). In this study we aimed to investigate food choice
by addressing the interplay of physiological, affective and cognitive factors. By
using a DDM approach, we assessed how hunger, calorie content and prefer-
ence shape the accumulation of information patterns in food choice. Having
participants fast for 12 hours successfully induced a state of hunger evident in
the subjective ratings and the speed of accumulation of information to reach
the choice. Conversely, subjective preference for the food items was not mod-
ulated by the hunger state.
The results reported here show that choosing high CD or low CD food is
equally probable, given that the boundary is equidistant from the starting
point and that there is no previous bias towards either choice. The analy-
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Figure 4.3: Posterior probability distribution of the drift-rate parameters (v).
a: preference*hunger model with hunger x preference. b: Main effect model
of preference. c: Main effect model of hunger. LP = Low Preference; HP =
High Preference.
sis of the posterior parameter distributions of the drift-rates instead showed
significant differences in the speed of the decision process. In other words, as
evident by the preference*hunger model, the speed was higher towards low CD
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Figure 4.4: Posterior probability distribution of the bias parameter depending
on CD for the preference*hunger model (z).
foods when participants were fed and the items were highly preferred, while
it was higher towards high CD foods when participants were hungry and the
foods were less preferred. This supports the assumption that low CD preferred
foods accumulated evidence for the food choice in a faster manner when fed.
Whereas, when hungry, accumulation of information was faster for high CD,
non preferred foods.
Here, we demonstrate for the first time that there is a complex interplay
of factors in food choice with effects going in different directions - i.e., hunger,
caloric content and preference - which the HDDM approach allows us to dis-
entangle and to point to specific aspects of the decision process.
In line with Charbonnier et al. (2015), our participants chose more often
low CD than high CD foods. The authors hypothesized that this was owed
to the fed state of their participants, which we confirm here by looking at
the differences in the accumulation of information patterns for low CD and
high CD foods when fed but not when hungry. Considering that there was
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no initial bias towards either food category based on CD, it can be argued
that the physiological state of hunger is responsible for this food choice pat-
tern. At the neural level, as suggested by Siep et al. (2009), these different
patterns of accumulation of information may be underlined by a greater activa-
tion in the right insula and medial orbitofrontal and ventromedial pre-frontal
cortex for high CD foods when hungry. This would be in line with the role of
orbitofrontal cortex in representing value-based decision alternatives, as pre-
viously contended (see Levy and Glimcher, 2011). An attempt to all together
consider hunger, preference and calorie can be found in the work by Finlayson
et al. (2007), who used food fat content as a proxy for CD. One of their main
results is that hunger unbalanced the choices of participants towards highly fat
foods (which can be equated to the high CD food items in our design). On the
other hand, while being satiated they were driven towards their preferred food
irrespective of calories. In contrast with their results, in our study, hunger did
not seem to affect our preference ratings. In spite of this, in our sample the
analysis of the posterior drift-rates let emerge an effect of preference on the
choice of low and high CD foods. This discrepancy in the subjective ratings
may be due to a methodological reason. When controlling for arousal, typi-
cality, familiarity and valence of the food images, the preference range may be
constrained, therefore reducing variability irrespective of hunger states (Foroni
et al., 2013). Furthermore, in line with Bielser et al. (2016), our data suggest
that liked foods tend to be chosen more often than non-liked food, even though
such pattern is not extremely skewed, due to a general preference for the the
food items presented. Such intuitive result confirms that liked items require
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lower decision times (Kahnt et al., 2014), even when the choice is forced among
two alternatives (Bielser et al., 2016).
All in all, the present findings extend the investigation of food choice which
has been mostly addressed via the analysis of self-report questionnaires or be-
haviorally via frequentist statistical approaches which allow only for the eval-
uation of one relevant factor at a time. Conversely, applying a computational
HDDM approach by simultaneously considering the effect of hunger, prefer-
ence and calorie on food choice, allows us to overcome this shortcoming. Our
results show that the food choice process deviates from the homo economicus
assumptions, in allowing the choice not to be uniquely determined by fixed -
i.e., exogenous - preferences but demonstrating that the real food choices are
malleable to changes in physiological and subjective states. Hereby we contend
that this approach is a strong candidate for the assessment of the complexities
of food choice, contributing to a nuanced view of value-based decision in a
unified framework (see Krajbich et al., 2015). The importance of being able to
experimentally model nuanced food value-based decisions seems to be reflected
at the neural level by greater activation in a network of regions known to pro-
cess salience-related information and cognitive control processes (Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Mitchell, 2011), including the insula, the dorsolateral pre-frontal
cortex, and the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex.
One might argue that the data are based on fictional food choices since they
were only mediated by food items that people visually inspected but were never
able to eat. If on the one hand this represents a limitation of the current study,
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it extends a flourishing literature demonstrating that visual features maximally
contribute to ecological food choices (see Foroni et al., 2013, 2016; Levy and
Glimcher, 2011). On the other hand a future extension of the present work
would consider the use of real food choices would significantly modulate the
accumulation of information patterns hereby found.
To conclude, I showed that food choices are complex decision processes
that require the assessment of conflicting information, including one’s hunger
state, the calories of the food item and the subjective preference for those
items. Furthermore, by capitalizing on the HDDM approach, this work sheds
light on how to nuanced computation models represent the next frontiers in
understanding multifaceted decision-making and value assessment processes,
such as those regarding food. The present work is to be included among
the efforts toward simultaneously understanding the computational basis of
decision-making in the context of the systems that serve as homeostatic reg-
ulators of feeding (Rangel, 2013). Given the complexity of the phenomenon,
I believe that this approach can help understand the contribution of factors
not considered in this study, such as socio-economical ones, food attitudes,
pathological behaviors towards food (e.g., obesity and anorexia) and sensory
features of foods.
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5. General Discussion
In this thesis I aimed to present you a template for the investigation of food
choice employing a set of different techniques, namely behavioral, computa-
tional and neuroimaging analyses. Food choice is in fact a complex, multifac-
torial, phenomenon and, to be studied, it needs to be broken down into its
main components, to investigate their interaction in different contexts. After
I introduced you to its main dimensions (physiology, affect and cognition), I
guided you through a set of studies aimed at investigating each of these di-
mensions as well as how they interact, to deepen our understanding of how
food choice are made.
In order to achieve the main goal, I tried to convey the idea that it is
possible to study food choice in an experimental setting without extremely
sacrificing its ecological and contextual validity. This has been done by try-
ing, on the one hand, to harness the ideas and concepts of decision-making
research in neuroscience (Levy and Glimcher, 2011) and experimental psychol-
ogy (Ko¨ster, 2003). This included a paradigm, BFC, which represents a good
compromise between ecology and rigor, alongside more control on confounding
variables and the stimuli employed, through the use of databases. On the other
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hand, this has been done by focusing on the specific dimensions of food choice
(physiology, affect and cognition) studied in the vast, sometimes qualitative,
research of food choice in ecological contexts of consumer research (Grunert,
2002).
In chapter 2 I showed that even with a theoretically simple physiological
variable such as calories, there are cognitive aspects that can change the way
they are understood altering choice behavior. As already pointed out, calories
represent a very important feature of food, as they provide nutrients for our
brains and bodies. However, many studies in the literature do not seem to
distinguish between two important ways of counting calories, and therefore
energy intake. One is a relative way and relies on the type of food (calories x
quantity), that we called caloric density (CD), the other one is absolute and
counts the total number of calories in a given portion of food, and we called
it caloric content (CC). In the BFC task, participants chose foods that were
combined along these two dimensions. As they were instructed to maximize
the calories, if they were to act according to some sort of utility maximization
principle (as the homo economicus would predict) they would try to maximize
CC, as this value represents the total calories they could get. However, this
was not the case, as participants chose mostly relying on CD. This pointed
to a possible bias in understanding how calorie are counted, as participants
would rely on the type of food to evaluate how many calories they have in front
of them, making how big is the portion secondary. This is a relevant point,
since relying on the relative number of calories of the food has been shown to
produce biased estimates of portion and meal size. As argued in chapter 2,
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this has been shown to cause significant overeating, mostly without peoples’
awareness (Rolls et al., 2002, 2004b,a; Diliberti et al., 2004).
After focusing on a powerful motivational factor in driving food choice
and consumption, namely calories, and how this is cognitively interpreted, I
wanted to investigate how a powerful motivational factor in controlling intake,
namely food safety, would impact food choice. In chapter 3 I investigated
how the risk of a food being contaminated would affect the participants’ food
choices between two options. Building on the design of Study 1, I devised a
BFC which included food images with different CC and CD as well varying
probabilities of contamination (from 0% to 100%). Here, the task was to
maximize calories while minimizing risk. I expected participants to try to avoid
poisoned food as much as possible, that is choosing the lowest risk. Such goal
may be achieved by implementing a minimax strategy (Von Neumann, 1959).
However, I doubted that participants would rely only on this conservative and
rational behavior and still choose more caloric items than you would expect
given this strategy. The results showed that this was the case. In fact the effect
of risk was partially diminished but, in line with Study 1, by relying on CD,
and not on CC. That is, the type of food seemed to make a difference in driving
the choice, while the total number of calories did not, which is what you might
have expected if participants had simply calculated the number of calories they
needed, pointing to a different mechanism. The fMRI results supported this
idea, with the deactivation of the rAI and activation of pre-SMA in diffCD
compared to diffCC and Control, respectively, highlighted differences in the
demands of the task as well as the role of risk.
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After having found that there is an interplay between cognitive and affective
components, I decided to test how a physiological component might impact on
the affective dimension. In chapter 4, I investigated whether hunger would
impact choice of food items based on preference. As the food images chosen
for the BFC varied along the CD dimension, I expected calories to impact on
preference as well. The results showed that hunger impacted choice patterns
significantly. As our HDDM results show, while hungry, participants tended
to focus more on the items’ CD, with the accumulation of information for the
high CD choice being faster for less preferred items. On the other hand, while
satiated, participants seemed to rely more on preference, as the information
accumulated more rapidly towards the more preferred and low CD food items.
5.1 Food choice in the lab (revised)
Food choice, as thoroughly explained in this work, is a complex and context-
dependent phenomenon. This seems at odds with studying it in a very con-
trolled environment such as a laboratory. While I agree in principle with this
remark, I still think most of the elements of food choice can be studied in
a laboratory with proper care. Although it is arguably very difficult to re-
produce the context of a meal at home or food shopping in a supermarket1,
we can approximate some of the features of the decision process that actually
take place in these context while, at the same time, taking advantage of the
control that a laboratory setting allows in order to reduce the noise in favor of
1One example in this direction exists, i.e. the “Restaurant of the Future” in Wageningen
University, but indeed represents a unicum in the food choice line of research.
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the signal. For instance, my participants had to choose among food pictures
instead of real food. While it is not the same, lacking the smell and texture,
many studies have shown that primate and human food selection relies mostly
on vision (Laska et al., 2007; Linne´ et al., 2002), and that the sight of food can
elicit a wide range of physiological, cognitive and emotional responses that are
related to food consumption (van der Laan et al., 2011). So, I would argue,
as long as it is food choice and not food intake that it is investigated, using
pictures represents an acceptable solution.
Employing a BFC can face similar criticisms. One might argue, in fact,
that everyday choices are seldom, if ever, binary. The typical choice among
different food items in a supermarket scaffolding is a representative example.
The same goes, in most cases, for a menu in a restaurant. However, real-world
equivalents of BFC are present and often encountered. Think, for instance,
about having lunch in a canteen. Here choices can be binary (e.g., pasta vs.
rice, chicken vs. frittata) and hunger does have an impact. If you compare
the same person on different days, on the first being hungry while on the
second not, there you have a real world scenario which is not too dissimilar
from study presented in chapter 4. However, the limitations of a BFC should
be acknowledged, and in fact it would be interesting to replicate and extend
the studies here to multiple forced-choice paradigms (simulating a choice from
a restaurant menu, for instance). There are already studies that extend the
DDM approach to multiple choice tasks (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Towal
et al., 2013). Interestingly, one of their conclusions is that, although the effect
is smaller, it is likely that the same computational model that works for binary
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choices can extend to ternary and other simple purchasing decisions (Krajbich
et al., 2012). However, these studies still face the same limitations of previ-
ous works in the same line (the aforementioned poor control of food-specific
variables). Nonetheless, this is a promising line of research, and the constant
improvement of computational modeling (Wiecki et al., 2013) offers hope to
make tasks more ”manageable”, such as, for instance, reducing the number of
trials needed for the model to converge2.
5.2 Calories do matter
Among other relevant variables in food choice that one could have focused on
(e.g., price, availability, color, etc...), we chose calories. Why? As pointed
out in the introduction, calories provide the fuel that our brains and bodies
require to function. The need to metabolize a lot of calories in a reliable and
efficient way is one of the goals that have shaped the evolution of our digestive
apparatus (Wrangham, 2009). However, one might question why focusing on
calories and not on more specific variables. After all, we do not seem to
spend much time consciously monitoring our energy intake, relying mostly on
non-conscious feeding mechanisms, such as hormonal regulation (e.g., ghrelin,
Wren et al., 2001) to guide our eating behavior. Moreover, although different
nutrients seem to have a differential impact on motivational aspects of eating
(e.g., craving for sugars but not for proteins), we did not investigate the effects
of macronutrients such as proteins, fats or carbohydrates in influencing food
2Which, right now, is fairly high, as seen in chapter 4, and poses serious limitation in
extending DDM to, for instance, fMRI.
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choice. Is the relative balance of macronutrients important for food choice? If
so, does it overshadow the role of calorie tracking?
This question is not new and, for what concerns weight management, the
answer would seem to be: not much. In their widely cited study, Kinsell
et al. (1964) had their obese patients undergo the same liquid-formula diet
totaling the same number of calories but with widely varying macronutrient
compositions (fat from 12 to 83 %, protein from 14 to 36% and carbohydrates
from 3 to 64 %). Their results showed that all obese patients lost weight at a
constant rate, no matter the relative composition of the diet. What matters, it
seemed, was just the number of calories. A 2001 review of several types of diets,
found that calorie balance was a major determinant of weight loss, and that all
diets were effective, regardless of their composition, provided they restricted
calorie intake to max 1500 per day (Freedman et al., 2001). A more recent
year-long clinical trial conducted by Gardner et al. (2007) comparing different
low-fat, high-fat and low-carbohydrate diets in roughly 300 overweight women
found the high fat diet more effective. However, the researchers note that the
difference was highest after six months and progressively reduced and it would
have likely waned if the study lasted longer. What these studies seem to point
out is that:
The source of the calories may make a small difference in weight
maintenance or loss, but it appears to be much less important than
the ability to resist pressures to overeat calories in general.(Nesheim
and Nestle, 2012, p.172).
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This reasoning goes into the same line as recent policies that try to address
the problem by actually acting on the calorie-rich environment in which we live,
on the one hand by increasing general awareness of calories with compulsory
calorie labeling 3, on the other by pressuring the food industry into reducing
portion sizes 4 which, as we have seen in chapter 2, often influence calorie
estimation on a par with the type of food itself.
5.3 Bayes in the plate. New approaches to
study food choices
Analogously to what is happening to the study of decision-making, it is prob-
ably time to study food choice more rigorously. The development of quan-
titative and computational models in cognitive neuroscience has reached the
stage where they can be successfully applied to more complex and multifarious
phenomena than what they used to in the beginning (i.e., memory retrieval
or perceptual decision-making for the DDMs, Heekeren et al. (2008); Rat-
cliff (1978)). The framework provided by Bayesian statistics, which provides
estimates of the uncertainty of models, and Dynamic Causal Inference, al-
lows modelling to take into account more than single factors of interest (such
as calorie and hunger) but also more complex socio-economical and personal
variables and investigate how these factors act together to shape the choice
3Such as with the initiatives of the food and drug administration (FDA) in the US, which
is trying to improve package labeling by requiring chain restaurants and vending machines
to provide nutrient information about the food they offer (Food et al., 2014).
4This is what happened, for instance, in New York City, where mayor Michael Bloomsberg
banned large sugary drinks for consumption (Grynbaum, 2012).
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process. This can capitalize on DDMs or race models (such as Linear Ballistic
Accumulators) in allowing to track how the accumulation of information in
favor of one out two or more options unfolds, depending on variables that map
psychological or neural processes. Interesting in this direction is the work by
Krajbich and colleagues, who use DDMs alongside eye-tracking and neuroimag-
ing data (Krajbich and Smith, 2015) to investigate the effects of attention and
gaze fixation on food choice. Indeed neuroimaging data can be included into
the computational model (see Wiecki’s group work with EEG and deep-brain
stimulation, DBS, Cavanagh et al., 2011), accounting for the variation and the
process underlying it as it influences the outcome. I believe applying these
methods to ask interesting and relevant questions about food choice and how
the bran implements them is important, as the large availability of food in
rich countries, the rising of obesity, climate and environmental concerns pose
significant issues to our well-being and survival of our species.
5.4 Epilogue
All in all, the results of the studies presented here show that it is possible to
study food choice tackling its different relevant dimensions and their interplay.
This can be done by using a framework that allows different questions to be
asked, while accounting for possible confounds and some limited sacrifice in
terms of its ecological validity. I have tried to achieve this by using a carefully
controlled task (BFC) and stimuli, alongside the use of a multitude of statistical
(such as linear mixed models, drift-diffusion models) and technical (behavioral,
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neuroimaging) approaches.
To convey this message I focused my attention on a few relevant dimensions
and their interplay. I believe the studies here managed to show that: a) calories
matter, and that we consider them as a relative quantity, focusing mostly on
the type of food (CD) with less regard to the total quantity (CC), which
has implications in terms of how much we eat; b) food safety produces risk
aversion, especially when it is framed in quantitative terms, but allows some
room to evaluate calories in terms of their CD. The fMRI results show that the
interplay of risk and CD seems to be tracked by the activity of the right anterior
insula and the pre-SMA, suggesting that risk is processed and as a result of
such elaboration, weights are assigned to different probabilities depending on
CD. c) hunger (and lack thereof) influence choice by acting differently on either
preference or calories, and this effect can be nicely captured by a computational
model (HDDM) that tracks how the information is accumulated during the
trial in favor of the different options.
Overall, the studies presented here provide a template to map a multi-
factorial, complex and context-dependent phenomenon such as food choice.
However, this is just a tiny step in the direction towards a more rigorous and
ecological investigation of how we actually choose food on a daily basis. Given
the stakes, though, I believe it is a good idea to walk this way.
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